"EOD, Up!" how explosive ordnance disposal forces can best support special operations forces by Draper, Stephen R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-06
"EOD, Up!" how explosive ordnance disposal forces
can best support special operations forces
Draper, Stephen R.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
“EOD, UP!”: HOW EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 









 Thesis Advisor:   Kalev Sepp 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  “EOD, Up!”: How Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Forces Can Best Support Special Operations Forces 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Stephen R. Draper 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT 
U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are likely to undertake missions against terrorists, insurgents, 
and other enemies where they will encounter explosive hazards. Identification, detection, and neutralization 
of weapons of mass destruction, improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and similar weapons requires 
the support of technicians trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), an expertise that is not resident in 
SOF units. Consequently, there is a need for EOD technicians with SOF capabilities who can readily 
integrate with them. This thesis employs a variety of methodologies, from an analysis of required 
capabilities to an application of game theory, to determine how SOF can be best supported by existing 
EOD forces and how the supporting command structures and relationships may be improved. It concludes 
that the Navy’s EOD force is best suited to provide support to SOF, and should be included in all special 
operations planning documents. Those Navy EOD units tasked to provide support to SOF should be 
consolidated into one organization dedicated to that mission. Finally, when supporting SOF, the Navy 
should replace its current eight-person EOD operational element with a two-man team that will better 
match SOF operational requirements. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
125 
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Explosive Ordnance Disposal, EOD, Special Operations Forces, 
SOF, hyper-conventional, SOF support, force enablers, game theory, SWAT, initial trust, 
Technical Intelligence, hostage rescue, requirements analysis, counter-terrorism, Improvised 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
“EOD, UP!”: HOW EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL FORCES CAN BEST 
SUPPORT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
 
 
Stephen R. Draper 
Lieutenant, United States Navy  
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1999 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are likely to undertake missions 
against terrorists, insurgents, and other enemies where they will encounter 
explosive hazards.  Identification, detection, and neutralization of weapons of 
mass destruction, improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and similar 
weapons requires the support of technicians trained in explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD), an expertise that is not resident in SOF units. Consequently, 
there is a need for EOD technicians with SOF capabilities who can readily 
integrate with them.   This thesis employs a variety of methodologies, from an 
analysis of required capabilities to an application of game theory, to determine 
how SOF can be best supported by existing EOD forces and how the supporting 
command structures and relationships may be improved.  It concludes that the 
Navy’s EOD force is best suited to provide support to SOF, and should be 
included in all special operations planning documents.  Those Navy EOD units 
tasked to provide support to SOF should be consolidated into one organization 
dedicated to that mission.  Finally, when supporting SOF, the Navy should 
replace its current eight-person EOD operational element with a two-man team 
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Terrorists, insurgents, and other enemies of the state have long embraced 
the use of explosive devices in the pursuit of their goals, and these methods are 
increasingly employed in operations against established governments.1  The 
proliferation of nuclear devices as well as other chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons poses new and tempting options for enemies of 
the state.  In the National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush identifies 
this as the gravest danger to the nation and refers to open declarations by our 
enemies that they are actively seeking such weapons.2  Explosives in the form of 
bombs, booby-traps, and other threats are a proven weapon of the weak in a 
conflict between asymmetric powers.  Beyond the psychological effects of bombs 
on the general population3, such devices deny access and inflict casualties upon 
first responders and bystanders.  In the National Military Strategy, General 
Richard Meyers stated that the foremost priority of the United States military was 
to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  One of the most effective tools the 
United States has and will continue to employ strategically and tactically in 
fighting the GWOT is Special Operations Forces (SOF). 
 
The high stakes involved with strategic special operations and, more 
specifically, the higher military and political risks consequent to their failure, 
necessitate their being used as last resort.  But sometimes, when diplomacy fails, 
the government is left with no alternative to the assertion of national power 
through military means.  In areas outside of designated war zones, often the only 
                                            
1Rick Jervis, “Militants Sharing Bomb Expertise,” USA Today, 24 October 2005, pg 1. 
2 President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 2002), 1. 
3 While leading thinkers’ definitions of terrorism differ, they all have in common the goal of a 
psychological impact (namely that of terror) upon a general audience. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, 
“Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security, Winter 
2002-03: 30-58, and Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, July 
1981: 379-399.  
2 
tool through which national military power can be brought to bear is strategic 
special operations. 
 
Non-strategic special operations, which are undertaken in designated war 
zones in support of ongoing war plans, are much more common than those of a 
strategic nature.  While non-strategic special operations may entail less political 
risk than strategic ones, explosive threats still are encountered that require 
neutralization for the successful completion of the mission.  
 
In both cases, the government is obliged to ensure its special operations 
forces have the necessary skills, equipment, and support to be successful.  As 
this thesis illustrates, many of these missions expose the special operations 
forces to explosive threats that require explosive ordnance disposal support with 
hyper-conventional capabilities to be seamlessly integrated into the team. 
 
Tactical and strategic operations that fall under the purview of the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) increasingly require the 
support of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units.  These units have the 
expertise to render safe explosive ordnance and improvised explosive devices as 
well as to allow SOF to detect, identify, and neutralize CBRN threats. This is true 
in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), 
specifically, as well as those missions launched worldwide by USSOCOM as 
supported command in the GWOT.  Bomb-makers are often the targets of SOF 
operations and are known to protect their homes and work-shops with improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs).  Arms caches, frequently discovered by SOF, are also 
commonly booby-trapped. In fact, nearly every primary mission with which 




Identification, detection, and neutralization of threats from weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, and the 
like requires the support of technicians trained in EOD, an expertise that is not 
organic to SOF units.  The various services’ EOD forces possess these skills and 
can enable access to and facilitate operations in environments from which SOF 
would otherwise be denied.  Consequently, EOD forces are increasingly 
requested and tasked to support USSOCOM missions.  The requests and 
tasking of EOD forces to provide support to SOF are often informal, with ad-hoc 
relationships developed as needed under the stress of combat, which may result 
in less than optimal support. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine how Special Operations Forces 
can be best supported by the Department of Defense’s various EOD forces. 
Having determined a model that will most likely result in more effective support of 
SOF, and thereby the enhancement of SOF capabilities, this thesis recommends 
the steps necessary to provide such a model to SOF operators. 
 
Formal and ubiquitous recognition of the Navy’s EOD force as the one 
best suited to provide support to SOF should be institutionalized and included in 
all special operations planning documents.  Those EOD units that are tasked with 
providing SOF support should be consolidated into one organization dedicated to 
that mission.  Finally, the current operational element employed by the Navy’s 
EOD units should, when supporting SOF, be replaced by a two-man team that 




This thesis is presented in two parts and employs a variety of 
methodologies.  The first part employs a requirements analysis that presents a 
4 
model for more effective EOD support of SOF.  First, SOF missions and tasks 
are analyzed to determine the nature of the need for EOD support by SOF.  
Once the nature of the recurring requirement for EOD expertise is determined, 
this thesis examines that requirement both in terms of the core tasks of 
USSOCOM as well as each service’s forces within the special operations chain 
of command.  This examination of tasks presents commonalities in the 
capabilities required of those EOD units that support SOF.  These capabilities 
establish the criteria for optimized support against which each service’s EOD 
forces are compared in an effort to determine which service’s EOD forces are 
best suited to SOF support. 
 
The second part of this thesis identifies potential obstacles to the 
integration of external support into SOF units at the tactical level and offers some 
recommendations for overcoming them.  The problems inherent in the integration 
of support personnel into an existing, elite team that has been trained and drilled 
to precision are addressed.  The issues of trust, distrust, and influence that are 
encountered in such a situation are examined.  Next, the principles of game 
theory are applied to the scenario of a terrorist contemplating the employment of 
explosive threats, in the form of IEDs and booby-traps, against a SOF unit that is 
itself weighing the option of integrating an EOD capability into its assaulting 
force.  The application of Game Theory to the situation suggests interesting 
conclusions for both SOF and EOD commanders that impact doctrine and 
training.  The exercise highlights the fact that the costs of integrating EOD 
personnel can be drastically reduced through joint training, thereby negating one 




Chapter II defines the problem by examining the legitimacy and nature of 
the need for EOD support of SOF.  This chapter presents a discussion of existing 
5 
and emerging SOF core tasks that exhibit a potential to require EOD support.  
Analysis by task is followed by an outline of USSOCOM units with missions that 
cause their personnel to face an explosive threat and may require EOD support.  
The chapter presents an analysis of common characteristics, capabilities, and 
skills that would be required of EOD forces tasked with providing such support to 
SOF. 
 
Chapter III discusses organizational and personnel capabilities of the 
existing EOD forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.  It presents 
an overview of training both common to all services as well as that which is 
unique to a particular one.  Organizational structures of operational elements are 
discussed and their missions detailed. 
 
Chapter IV details the unique development of the Navy’s EOD force and 
then matches the capabilities required of EOD forces in support of SOF and 
those currently possessed by each service’s existing EOD forces.  It then offers a 
model for more effective EOD support of USSOCOM units and missions. 
 
Chapter V discusses a commander’s decision to integrate EOD personnel 
into a tactical unit, the obstacles likely to be encountered in doing so, and offers 
methods to surmount them.  An application of game theory as it relates to that 
decision makes clear the advantages and disadvantages of both the assaulting 
SOF as well as the terrorists.  This application of game theory highlights the 
benefits of integrating EOD technicians into the assaulting force when an 
explosive threat is suspected; and it indicates how joint training can minimize any 
disruption caused by the addition of external personnel to an assault force.  This 
is followed by a discussion of the intelligence required by the tactical unit 
commander who may suspect an explosive threat and is faced with the decision 
6 
to integrate an EOD capability into an assault.  Finally, the resulting issues of 
trust and authority are outlined, as well as their proposed solutions.  
 
Chapter VI presents the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis 
and identifies areas for further research. 
 
C. IMPACT AND RESULTS 
 
This thesis provides commanders of SOF and EOD units information 
regarding ways to better optimize their training and the operational relationships 
between their units.  Implementation of the recommendations offered will allow 
EOD commanders to achieve the best fit between the organization and training 
and operational employment of their forces.  This will increase the SOF’s 
likelihood of success against an adversary who increasingly turns to explosives 
to equalize the asymmetric power balance between itself and the state.  SOF 
commanders will see that the existence of a support element that can provide the 
necessary expertise to enable access to areas otherwise denied by IEDs and 
booby-traps without affecting mission effectiveness or mobility will boost the 
combat power of USSOCOM units.  They will also recognize that training of 





In order to facilitate discussion of this thesis within a broad military and 
civilian audience, some terms first must be defined.  Special Operations Forces 
are defined as those tactical units falling under the purview of USSOCOM.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, SOF primarily refers to those tactical military units 
whose personnel, through the execution of their duties, regularly and directly 
7 
encounter the threat of explosive devices and booby-traps.  But the principles 
involved and explosive threats encountered are universal to special operations 
teams, and the term can be inferred to imply SWAT teams and other government 
agencies’ special operations units.  Throughout this thesis these teams are 
alternately referred to as SOF or the tactical or elite team or unit. 
 
Likewise, EOD refers primarily to those military units and individuals who 
are specifically trained, organized, and equipped to safely locate, identify, and 
perform procedures intended to render explosive threats safe.  Each branch of 
the military maintains its own EOD capabilities that are particularly focused on 
ordnance, munitions, and situations unique to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or 
Marines.  For the purposes of this thesis, however, EOD can imply those teams 
and individuals who are trained, equipped, and tasked with similar responsibilities 
within police departments (police bomb squads) and other government 
departments and bureaus such as the bomb technicians in the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.  Individuals trained and qualified by their 
applicable authorities to perform the actions required to render safe explosive 
threats are referred to as “technicians,” or by the shorthand “tech,” as in “bomb 
disposal technician” or “EOD tech.”  
 
The more technical and specific term “CBRNE”, referring to chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced explosives, will henceforth be 
replaced by the more recognized and ubiquitous Weapons of Mass Destruction/ 
Enhanced explosives (WMD/E).  The National Military Strategy’s discussion of 
the subject states  
 
The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities 
that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes 




explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons”. 
They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic 
effects.4 
  
For the purposes of this thesis, WMD/E is used, except when the author 
wants to raise specific or technical points for which the term proves too general.  
In such instances, CBRN may be used in whole or in part, and WMD may be 
used when discussing Counter-Proliferation, a mission more directed against 
nuclear, chemical, and biological threats rather than enhanced explosives. 
 
Finally, “EOD, up!” is the command commonly used to call the embedded 
EOD element of an assault unit from his usual position of rear security.  When an 
assaulting team encounters an explosive hazard such as a trip wire or other 
booby-trap, it must avoid the area or stop altogether until the EOD technician can 
assess it and render it safe. 
                                            
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), 1. 
9 
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: DETERMINING THE NATURE 
OF EOD SUPPORT OF SOF 
Special operations are operations that are conducted in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, 
and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no 
broad conventional force requirement.5  SOF activities are distinct from any 
others because they are not performed by conventional forces or comprise 
capabilities that do exist in the conventional force but are performed to a unique 
set of conditions or standards.6  Special operations are recognized as involving a 
greater degree of physical and political risk, unique operational techniques, and 
unorthodox modes of employment.  In addition, special operations often require 
independence from friendly support and a capacity to self-sustain in austere 
environments, often far behind enemy lines.  Special operations are often 
launched in response to emergent crises that “present limited windows for 
effective execution and often require first-time access.”7  Due to their high-
standards and unique skills, SOF are the core of the United States’ ability to 
combat terrorism, counter proliferation of WMD, and conduct unconventional 
warfare.8 
 
Countering the proliferation of WMD and destroying Al Qaeda and other 
parts of the international terrorist network are urgent national priorities that fall 
squarely within the missions of SOF; preempting global terrorist and WMD 
                                            
5 U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 
2003-2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 2004), 7. 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05: Joint Doctrine for Special Operation, 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2003), II-3. 
7 Kevin Deremer, Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Army Transformation: Is Army 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Prepared to Support Forces in the Emerging Environment?, (FT 
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 27. 
8 USSOCOM, Posture Statement, 7. 
10 
threats is the SOF community’s top priority.9  The special operations community’s 
charge to “fill the gaps” in capabilities of the conventional forces also requires it 
to adapt.  As conventional forces evolve and tailor themselves to emerging 
requirements, they will take on more tasks that SOF currently performs.  As they 
do so, SOF will “increase their capacity to perform more demanding and 
specialized tasks.” 10  Among other changes identified by the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, SOF will develop and maintain a “greater capacity to detect, 
locate, and render safe WMD.”11  This will require personnel specially trained for 
the specific hazards encountered.  Expertise in these required techniques and 
capabilities is currently found in EOD technicians who are outside the SOF 
community. 
 
The following discussion outlines some of SOF’s core tasks, as delineated 
and defined in Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.  
These missions are widely accepted, and many have been foundational to 
special operations forces since their inception.  The basic tactics of the 
commando-style raids characterized by what is now termed “Direct Action” 
missions remain unchanged since antiquity12: that of well-trained soldiers raiding 
enemy camps, relying on speed, surprise, and overwhelming force to overcome 
the enemy.  All that has changed in these missions are techniques reflecting 
advances in technology.  
 
There are nine core SOF tasks outlined by JP 3-05.  Three of them, 
Information Operations, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs Operations, 
are more conventional in nature and unlikely to pose a requirement for EOD 
                                            
9 National Security Strategy, 5; National Military Strategy, iii; and USSOCOM, Posture 
Statement, 29. 
10 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 2006), 44. 
11 QDR, 44. 
12 John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern 
Times, (Lanham, MD: University Press, 1996), 1. 
11 
support beyond established capabilities.  For this reason, they are not discussed 
below.  The other six tasks do conceivably pose a need for EOD support that 
may eclipse the abilities of conventional forces.  The following discussion 
endeavors to analyze these missions in an attempt to identify those core SOF 
tasks that would likely require EOD support.  Following this discussion, a few 
specific SOF units’ primary missions are examined to further explore the need for 
EOD support of SOF.  Once the missions that may require EOD support are 
identified, common skills and capabilities required of the supporting personnel 
are distilled in an attempt to more clearly define the nature of that support.   
 
A. CORE TASKS IN WHICH SOF MAY ENCOUNTER EXPLOSIVE 
THREATS 
 
1. Direct Action (DA) 
 These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions 
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, 
destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. 
 
DA missions in support of the GWOT have included clearing terrorist 
bomb-makers’ houses and facilities, weapons cache seizure, and capturing high 
value targets wherever they may be found.  These and other DA missions often 
involve navigating booby-traps or breaching denied areas, which require EOD 
expertise.  An unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency report recognizes the 
unique threat posed by booby-traps and the specialized expertise required to 
safely neutralize it: 
The search and clearance of buildings, caves, abandoned vehicles 
or any suspect area is a specialized skill that requires expert 
knowledge of BT types and functions.  The clearance procedures 
are also highly skilled, requiring specialized equipment and training.  
12 
The task of BT search, clearance, and disposal is an EOD mission.  
If BTs are suspected, then EOD personnel should be tasked.13 
 
Immediately following the completion of a DA mission, the area is often 
searched for information and evidence that may be of value to intelligence 
analysts.  The systematic and detailed search of these areas is a process that 
has come to be known as sensitive site exploitation (SSE).  A sensitive site is 
“…a geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational, military, or 
economic sensitivity to the United States.”  SSEs were originally divided into two 
types: those that potentially contain WMD (or materials or information concerning 
development programs) and those thought to contain information or 
documentation that supported the former Iraqi regime’s atrocities and/or gave 
information regarding its structure.14  EOD technicians were critical to ensuring 
the safety of search personnel from explosive and CBRN hazards during SSE.  
Today, the search for Iraqi WMD and information regarding the former regime 
largely has ceased, but the SSE process has continued and has been expanded 
to include the search for forensic evidence and intelligence significant to the 
GWOT.  SSE of an area known or suspected to pose explosive threats requires 
EOD experts.  Bomb technicians are trained to recognize explosive hazards 
where other personnel may not, and can safely handle bomb making materials 
and components while preserving any forensic evidence for later analysis.   
 
SOF elements are afforded a large degree of protection from explosive 
hazards through their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  In OIF, for 
example, SOF elements are able to conduct many raids at night, thus reducing 
the odds of being attacked by an insurgent IED enroute.  Objectives are often 
                                            
13 Defense Intelligence Agency, Landmine and Explosive Hazards Reference Guide – 
Afghanistan  (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002),1-44. 
14 Pete Lofy, “Managing Sensitive Site Exploitation – Notes From Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM – From the Field,” Army Chemical Review, September 2003 [journal online]; available 
from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IUN/is_2003_Sept/ai_110574483.html; Internet; 
accessed 28 February 2006. 
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bombers’ residences, and wives and children frequently are present.  While it is 
generally unlikely that an insurgent will booby-trap his own home, especially if his 
family lives there as well, it does happen.  While SOFs do not encounter IEDs 
and other explosive hazards with the frequency that conventional forces do, the 
relative strategic and operational importance of special operations increases the 
consequences of a mission failure.  For this reason, EOD support of DA missions 
is a strategic and operational necessity. 
 
2. Special Reconnaissance (SR) 
These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a 
special operation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to collect 
or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military 
capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. 
 
The clandestine nature of special reconnaissance missions and the 
general goal of avoiding contact with the enemy largely negates the need for 
EOD support of SOF during these missions.  SR teams looking to avoid the 
enemy can just as easily avoid areas denied by explosive threats and booby-
traps.  But when SR teams have a fixed position into which they must insert (for 
example, when gathering intelligence on a target designated for a DA mission), 
the possibility of booby-traps that must be cleared prior to or upon the team‘s 
insertion must be taken into account.  If such a threat is deemed to exist or 
cannot be decisively ruled out, then the insertion of an EOD technician with the 
SR team is a prudent decision that may act as a force enabler and allow the 
completion of the mission. 
 
3. Counterterrorism (CT) 
These are operations that include offensive measures taken to prevent, 
deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.  SOF are specifically organized, 
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trained, and equipped to conduct covert, clandestine, or discreet CT missions in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.  These missions include, but 
are not limited to intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and 
infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist 
organizations, and non-kinetic activities aimed at the ideologies or motivations 
that spawn terrorism.15  To the extent that CT missions include DA operations, 
such as raids against terrorist networks and facilities and hostage rescue, the 
same explosive threats exist as are encountered in DA missions.  These can be 
booby-traps and IEDs placed along likely points of entry or at chokepoints to 
protect the facilities or to slow or stop any assaulting units.  Chapter V of this 
thesis includes an analysis of an application of game theory to determine the 
effects of terrorists employing explosive threats in this manner versus an 
assaulting SOF unit that may or may not integrate an EOD capability into the 
assaulting element. 
 
4. Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP)   
CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, 
or recover WMD. Actions taken to support DoD and other governmental agencies 
to prevent, limit, and/or minimize the development, possession, and employment 
of WMD, new advanced weapons, and advanced-weapon-capable technologies.  
SOF provide unique capabilities to monitor and support DoD policy.16 
 
Currently, operations focused upon countering the proliferation of WMDs 
are the purview of units specifically trained, organized, and equipped for such 
missions.  These Special Mission Units (SMUs) are capable of extremely rapid 
deployment anywhere in the world.  But the nature of today’s WMD threats and 
the difficulties in acquiring intelligence present the possibility of a situation where 
action must be taken prior to arrival of an SMU.  In such a case, specific units 
                                            
15 USSOCOM, Posture Statement, 36. 
16 ibid. 
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that already are deployed in each theater would be tasked with the counter 
proliferation mission.  These units require EOD experts trained in and equipped 
for the search, location, identification, and neutralization of foreign and 
improvised WMDs. 
 
5. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
These are operations that involve participation by civilian and military 
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.  SOF’s primary contribution to this 
interagency activity is to organize, train, advise, and assist host-nation (HN) 
military and paramilitary forces.  The nature of FID missions requires that they 
necessarily be conducted in countries which are considered “hot-spots” around 
the world.  These countries are often the sites of long-term conflicts where the 
host-nation’s government is still trying to gain political control.  Many of these 
countries were Soviet-controlled until the collapse of the Soviet Union, and they 
are still littered with mines, minefields, and UXO.  FID missions in such countries 
often assume a collateral SOF task of Humanitarian Demining, and they require 
the training of local forces in demining operations.  An EOD technician attached 
to a SOF team conducting FID operations of this type would greatly enhance the 
abilities of the team to not only neutralize explosive threats that eclipse the 
capabilities organic to the team, but also to train host-nation demining and EOD 
forces. 
 
6. Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and 
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted 
through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained 
equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.  The 
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nature of UW poses few situations when explosive ordnance or explosive threats 
eclipses the skills of the team engineer or those inherent to the team in general.  
The offensive use of explosives and booby-traps is not a skill trained or 
maintained by EOD forces.  But UW spans the spectrum of combat, and many 
times a team engaged in an UW mission is the only one available for emergent 
DA missions or cache clearance.  Such was the case in Afghanistan in the early 
months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.  While a SOF team conducting an 
UW mission may not need EOD expertise attached to it directly or for the entire 
protracted mission, it is important to maintain EOD technicians with the 
capabilities to reach, support, and operate with SOF teams in an UW 

























































































Direct Action X X X X X
Combatting Terrorism X X X
Foreign Internal Defense X X X
Unconventional Warfare X X X X X X
Special Reconnaissance X






Table 1.   SOF Tasks and Types of EOD Support Required 
 
B. SOF UNITS THAT FACE EXPLOSIVE THREATS 
The following is a discussion of the major combat forces within 
USSOCOM: the 75th Ranger Regiment, Army Special Forces (SF), Air Force 
Special Tactics Squadrons (STSs), Naval Special Warfare (NSW), and Marine 
17 
Corps Special Operations Forces (MARSOF).  The organizational structures of 
Special Operations Forces are detailed extensively in many easily accessible 
documents and sources.  Consequently, this thesis does not focus upon their 
various chains-of-command or administrative and operational mechanisms of 
control.  Instead, this thesis focuses on the range of missions tasked to each unit 
and examines the extent to which EOD support may be required.  This section 
ends with a general description of the characteristics of SOF personnel.  This 
provides the criteria against which EOD personnel from each service, as 
described in the following chapter, can be compared and contrasted in Chapter 
IV. 
 
1. 75th Ranger Regiment 
This unit provides a highly trained, forced entry, DA capable force on a 
scale much larger than any other Special Operations Force.  Ranger units can 
employ specialized insertion techniques to apply a high level of combat power in 
a precise manner.  Techniques for which Rangers are trained include insertion by 
parachute, helicopter, over land by foot or vehicle, or via small boat (both 
motorized and rubber rafts).  Rangers are trained extensively in building 
clearance, CQB, and operations at night aided by night-vision devices.  The 75th 
Ranger Regiment is USSOCOM’s largest DA force and can operate in platoon 
through regimental-sized forces, though the primary maneuver element remains 
the battalion.  Rangers specialize in the seizure of hostile or otherwise denied 
targets requiring forced entry, such as airfields; raids to destroy enemy facilities 
that require capabilities beyond those of conventional light infantry units.  The 
regiment maintains a Ranger Ready Force that can deploy on short-notice, with a 
company response time of nine hours and a battalion response time of eighteen 
hours.17  
 
                                            
17 Michael Evans, Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations in Support of Army 
Special Operations Forces: What Changes Are Required?, (FT Leavenworth, KS: US Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2004), 15-16. 
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2. Army Special Forces 
Organized into five Groups, each with its own geographical focus, Army 
SF – commonly referred to as Green Berets – operate primarily as Operational 
Detachment – Alphas (ODAs).  Each ODA comprises eleven soldiers 
commanded by a captain.  SF soldiers and officers are trained extensively in the 
customs and culture of their Group’s area of responsibility, and they are proficient 
in local languages, as well.  Further, each soldier is a subject matter expert within 
his ODA, with extensive training in either operations, intelligence, 
communications, weapons, engineering (to include demolitions), or medicine.  
ODAs are trained to conduct extended UW operations behind enemy lines and 
are extremely capable in DA and other missions in support of all of the SOF core 
tasks.  Like the Rangers, Green Berets are trained in many methods of insertion 
including parachute, helicopter, over land, or by boat.  Additionally, some ODAs 
are trained in and maintain the capability to discreetly breach enemy lines via 
parachute by employing High Altitude, Low Opening (HALO) and High Altitude, 
High Opening (HAHO) techniques, while others are trained in combat Self 
Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) operations.  Once on their 
objective, SF units are adept at the precise application of military force and are 
extensively trained in CQB, building clearance, and night operations. 
 
3. Air Force Special Tactics Squadrons 
The Air Force’s Special Operations Forces’ combatant units are 
Pararescuemen (PJs), and Combat Controllers (CCTs).  The combination of 
these two specialties has collected very well-trained airmen in one extremely 
capable and valuable force.  PJs are highly trained emergency medical 
technicians trained in varied methods of high-risk insertion and extraction into 
and out of hostile, non-permissive areas.  Their primary mission is Combat 
Search and Rescue (CSAR) of downed pilots and other personnel behind enemy 
lines or in the heat of battle.  To allow them to rapidly reach personnel in need of 
rescue or recovery literally anywhere and at any time, PJs are trained in every 
conceivable insertion and extraction method, from SCUBA to HALO jumping.  
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Once they reach the crash site, PJs can be faced with a host of explosive threats 
and hazardous devices.  The aircraft’s payload may still be intact and may be 
more dangerous due to the crash.  In addition to live ordnance, aircraft have 
many explosive devices within their many systems.  Ejection systems include 
explosive bolts on the canopy, explosive actuation devices on many of the rapid-
deployment systems, and a rocket booster on the seat.  Flare and chaff 
dispensers also pose explosive threats to rescue personnel at the site. 
 
Combat controllers are FAA-certified air traffic controllers trained to control 
the air space whereever their skills are needed.  They can set up navigational 
aids and operate an enemy air traffic control tower at an airfield that had been 
seized by Rangers or coordinate precision aerial bombardment of targets 
designated by ODAs behind enemy lines.  Combat controllers, like PJs and Army 
SF, maintain the capability to insert in many high-risk, overt and clandestine 
ways.  
 
4. Naval Special Warfare 
Comprising Special Boat Units (SBUs) and Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams, 
Navy Special Warfare units are USSOCOM’s maritime commandos.  SBUs 
operate heavily-armed and high-powered boats capable of clandestinely inserting 
SEALs on missions in coastal and riverine environments worldwide, day or night, 
in any weather condition.  SEALs specialize in DA missions in maritime 
environments, though their considerable skills in this mission area have led to 
widespread employment in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locales far removed from 
the nearest body of water.  But their primary mission is opposed boarding of 
vessels and off-shore platforms, as well as DA operations on enemy coastal 
facilities and hydrographic surveys of shorelines.  SEALs possess the broad 
array of insertion capabilities typical of other SOF units: parachuting (to include 
HALO/HAHO), helicopter insertion, convoying and patrolling over land, and 
insertion by boat and SCUBA.  Not surprisingly, SEALs excel in clandestine 
maritime insertion, and they are able to navigate great distances underwater to 
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avoid detection.  SEALs also regularly operate off of submarines and are able to 
lock-out and exit a submerged submarine and swim into a target without ever 
breaching the surface of the water. Once on target, they are highly trained in 
boarding vessels, CQB, building and ship clearing, and are expert marksmen. 
 
5. Marine Corps Special Operations Forces 
Formally established in February of 2006, MARSOF is still too new for in-
depth analysis of missions and requirements.  But some initial conclusions are 
possible.  MARSOF will likely be tasked with DA and FID missions that have a 
maritime component.18  These missions pose the same threats and requirements 
as any other SOF engaging in DA and FID.  MARSOF probably will be trained in 
the same insertion techniques, mobility and combat skills, and as skilled in CQB 
as existing SOFs, and any EOD support required by MARSOF would have to be 
skilled in these areas.  Additionally, port security, a likely component of the FID 









































































US Army Special Forces X X X X X X
75th Rangers X
Navy SEALs X X X X
AF Special Tactics X
MARSOF X X X
 
Table 2.   SOF Units with Missions Requiring EOD Support 
 
 
                                            
18 Wood, Sarah, Sgt., USA, “Marine Corps Special Ops Will Add to Military Capability, 
Commander Says,” American Forces Press Service, January 26, 2006, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil. 
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6. Characteristics of SOF Personnel 
SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen tend to be older and more mature than 
their conventional counterparts.  By the time they are trained and operating in 
SOF units, they have volunteered for demanding, high-risk training many times.  
In addition to volunteering, they have further distinguished themselves from 
conventional personnel by consistently proving they can perform at high 
standards under stressful and rigorous conditions.  SOF personnel operate in 
small, highly-mobile, widely-dispersed teams and routinely have responsibilities 
far greater than those of their conventional peers.19 
 
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that there are some skills and 
capabilities that are common to all SOF, regardless of their specialty.  These are 
high-risk tactics and techniques that require training above and beyond what is 
typical of conventional forces.  While some conventional units are trained in 
airborne assault and insertion, including static-line parachuting and rappelling 
and fast-roping from helicopters, the extent to which SOF have honed these skills 
is unique.  Free-fall insertion, HALO and HAHO parachute operations, is unique 
to SOF within the military.  Likewise, insertion via SCUBA, from submarines and 
otherwise, is a high-risk skill resident only in SOF.  SOF further distinguish 
themselves from conventional forces at their target by engaging in CQB and 
clearing buildings in a well-rehearsed, precise yet overwhelming application of 
combat power.  They are also capable of completing all actions at the objective 
at night aided by night-vision devices, a learned skill that requires constant 
training.   
 
Other combat skills are not unique to SOF, but are more highly developed 
than those of conventional forces.  Some examples are vehicle convoy tactics, 
patrolling on foot in rough terrain behind enemy lines, marksmanship, and 
                                            
19 Deremer, 43. 
22 
immediate action drills (IADs) – set plays for varying situations involving contact 
with the enemy.  Such “hyper-conventional” skills distinguish SOF from 
conventional forces.  Proficiency in these skills is required of any external 
elements providing operational support in combat situations.  External experts 
must be able to shoot, move, and keep up with the highly-trained operators they 
are supporting. 
 
Many of the SOF core tasks place SOF personnel in situations where they 
are likely to be threatened by explosive ordnance.  The threat may be the 
objective itself, as is the case with CP, or it may be denying access to the target, 
a tripwire or booby-trap.  FID missions in certain parts of the world will involve 
extensive demining and UXO training.  CSAR operations often involve 
specialized insertion and extraction techniques and explosive hazards at the 
crash site.  Counter proliferation of CBRNE is now the first priority of SOF20, and 
it cannot be completed without EOD support.  Unfortunately, the documents that 
delineate CP as SOF’s primary mission do not recognize that any EOD support is 
required.21 
 
Other missions may not entail foreseeable EOD requirements, such as 
UW.  But the possibility exists that the SOF team may encounter a requirement 
for EOD support once the mission has begun, perhaps for an emergent DA 
mission or a discovered weapons cache.  The clandestine nature of these 
operations, often undertaken behind enemy lines, would require an EOD force 
with specialized insertion capabilities.  Further, extraction would likely be 
impossible until the SOF team completed its protracted mission, and the EOD 
technician would have to blend and operate with them for the duration of the 
mission.   
                                            
20 USSOCOM, Posture Statement, 36. 
21 Joseph DiGuardo, LCDR, USN, Executive Officer, EODMU2, “Information paper: Navy 
EOD Support of Special Operations Forces,” email attachment to author, 14 October 2005. 
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In these cases, an EOD unit with the training, mobility skills, and 
capabilities commensurate to the SOF unit would greatly enhance that unit’s 
effectiveness.  EOD technicians who can insert in any manner, no matter the 
training required or risk involved, who can operate seamlessly with the SOF unit 
at the objective, and can neutralize explosive threats and enable access to 
denied areas could prove invaluable.  In emergent crises requiring first-time 
access within a small window of opportunity, a force of this type may be the 


























III.  SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION: EOD FORCE 
CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS 
Chapter II defined the problem by outlining the explosive hazards likely to 
be encountered by SOF.  The solution, to the extent one exists, will be found in 
one of the four service’s existing EOD forces.  This chapter discusses the 
organizational and personnel capabilities of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps’ EOD forces.  It begins by describing initial EOD training, which is common 
to all services, as well as by discussing some of the personal traits of recruits.  
Then the organization, missions, and capabilities of each service’s EOD forces 
are outlined.  A distinction is made between conventional and hyper-conventional 
capabilities, as it is the latter that are required for SOF support. 
 
A. INITIAL EOD TRAINING COMMON TO ALL SERVICES 
Candidates for qualification as EOD technicians in all services receive 
initial EOD training at the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal School 
(NAVSCOLEOD), a joint school run by the Navy, based at Eglin Air Force Base, 
Florida.  Soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are trained side-by-side in classes 
that are often composed of a mix of members of all services.  Initially, Navy-
specific classes are manned with Navy personnel but, through the course of 
instruction, students who fail to pass a module are rolled into the next class, 
regardless of type.  This results in the further mixing of the services within 
classes. 
 
All services allow direct accession into their EOD forces; recruits may 
proceed directly into the training pipeline after basic training.22  Most are 
volunteers.  A few young soldiers and airmen each year are designated upon 
enlistment to go to EOD training regardless of their desires, but those who 
                                            
22 For the Navy, this is a recent change.  Historically, sailors could only transfer laterally from 
other ratings after they had reached E-5.  This resulted in more mature EOD training candidates 
for navy EOD (with respect to the other services), as all sailors had at least a few years in the 
Fleet (some had many more years of experience) and the further experience of dive school. 
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determine that they do not want to be bomb technicians find abundant 
opportunities to correct the situation either by dropping on request (known as 
DOR) or indirectly by not applying themselves academically and failing out of 
training.  Airmen selected for training as EOD technicians attend a pre-training 
course at Lackland AFB, Texas, prior to assignment to NAVSCOLEOD.  If a 
soldier desires to become an EOD technician, he first must be selected for 
transfer by his command or be accepted directly into the program from boot 
camp.  Once selected, a candidate attends six weeks of pre-training at Redstone 
Arsenal, Alabama, before beginning seven months of training at NAVSCOLEOD. 
 
Sailors that enlist directly into the EOD pipeline must complete basic 
training (as is true of all services), then initial rating-specific training (known as A-
School).  Upon completion of A-School, sailors are transferred to dive school in 
Panama City, Florida, for three months of intensive training.  Trainees learn to 
safely dive using both open- and closed-circuit rigs.  Dive school serves as an 
initial screening mechanism, as sailors who cannot meet the strict physical 
standards and demanding academic program either DOR or fail out and are sent 
back to the fleet to serve within their previously selected rating.  Dive training is 
conducted by qualified Navy EOD technicians and provides further opportunity 
for interaction between recruits and experienced sailors and EOD technicians on 
both professional and informal levels, and the increased knowledge of the 
community that results allows recruits to make a more informed decision when 
they choose whether they stay or go.  Once sailors have completed dive training 
they are transferred to EOD school.  This pipeline results in more mature direct-
accession recruits than the other services.  Their experiences prior to arriving at 
Eglin AFB facilitates the development of the strong camaraderie and sense of 
esprit de corps that pervades the navy classes, as the trainees have already 
been through intense training together. 
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Once at Eglin, students are trained in all aspects of explosive ordnance 
disposal.  Students are instructed in basic categories of ordnance and fuze 
mechanics and basic demolition procedures.  Practical training covers all types of 
ground ordnance (mines, projectiles, rockets, and grenades), air ordnance 
(bombs, missiles, dispensers and their various payloads), and IEDs.  Non-
ordnance explosive hazards, such as aircraft ejection seats, gun systems and 
flare dispensers are covered as well. Students also are trained to detect, locate, 
identify, and neutralize chemical munitions, as well as in the decontamination of 
themselves and others.  Students at NAVSCOLEOD also are trained in the 
detection, location, and mitigation of hazards of nuclear ordnance and accidents. 
 
EOD training is recognized as being extraordinarily demanding 
academically.  Historically, out of every ten candidates who begin training only 
one or two graduate on time.  Three to six students graduate after being held 
back during some phase of training, and three never graduate at all.23 
 
B. ARMY EOD 
 
Most of the Army’s EOD forces are under the command of the 52nd 
Ordnance Group (EOD), located at Fort Gillem, Georgia.  This brigade 
commands four battalions with thirty-nine deployable EOD companies.  Five 
companies do not fall under the command of the 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD): 
two each assigned to US Army Europe and US Army Pacific, and one that is 
assigned to US Eight Army in Korea.  Each EOD battalion provides command 
and control for three to seven companies in support of each corps and theater 
support command.24 
 
                                            
23 Joshua DeMotts, Capt, USAF, “What’s that Ticking Noise?” Air Force Civil Engineer, Vol. 
13, No. 1 (2005): 17. 
24 Evans, 11. 
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The EOD company is the Army’s primary operational unit.  Each company 
is commanded by an EOD-qualified captain and comprises eighteen EOD 
technicians and three support personnel.  EOD companies are traditionally 
organized into light and heavy teams to execute responses.  Two-man light 
teams, with a staff sergeant team leader, are capable of responding to and 
rendering safe most conventional US and foreign ordnance and IEDs.25  Prior to 
employment in Iraq and Afghanistan, heavy teams, which are led by a sergeant 
first class and comprise two additional technicians, were called for in any 
scenario that eclipsed the capabilities of a light team.  Examples of such 
incidents are complex chemical or nuclear responses requiring multiple light 
teams.  Operations in support of OIF and OEF have required the restructuring of 
EOD companies and an informal rewriting of doctrine.  Now, while heavy team 
response is still a capability embedded in the companies, the preponderance of 
IED and UXO responses are by light teams, and personnel often are organized 
based on specific mission analysis.26 
 
Army EOD forces are tasked with providing EOD services on Army 
installations, for explosive ordnance in the physical possession of the Army, and 
on “land mass areas” except when an area is a specific responsibility of another 
service.27  Army EOD technicians maintain proficiency in rendering safe of all US 
and foreign conventional ordnance and, reflecting today’s major threats and bulk 
of responses, are capable of handling IEDs.   
 
Soldiers in the EOD specialty do not have to meet heightened physical 
standards beyond those of the Army in general.  Army EOD is a conventional 
combat service support force and does not inherently possess any hyper-
conventional capabilities.  A limited number of Army EOD technicians are trained 
                                            
25 Evans, 11. 
26 Evans, 12. 
27 Department of the Navy, OPNAVINST 8027.1G, Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 2. 
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in air assault operations and parachuting, but these qualifications are the result of 
individual opportunities and service in other specialties prior to designation as 
EOD technicians, rather than the result of an effort to build an EOD force with 
hyper-conventional capabilities. 
 
C. AIR FORCE EOD 
 
The Air Force’s EOD units are organized as flights assigned to air bases 
worldwide.  For example, US Air Force 1st EOD Flight is based at Langley AFB, 
Virginia, and US Air Force 8th EOD Flight is responsible for Kunsan AB, Korea.   
Each base commander has tactical control of his base’s flight.  Operationally, 
EOD flights are part of the Air Force’s civil engineering community.  This is the 
result of a series of organizational shifts throughout the 1970s reflecting the Air 
Force’s increased awareness and concern for air base survivability during the 
height of the Cold War.28  As base commanders studied base threats and 
defenses and began looking for ways to minimize the time required to return to 
airfield operations in the event of an attack, local EOD forces became 
increasingly important.  Once the requirement to quickly eliminate an ordnance 
threat to airfields was recognized as an integral component to airfield viability, 
EOD flights were moved under the civil engineering commands of each base, 
where they reside today. 
 
Air Force EOD flights are tasked with providing EOD services “on Air 
Force installations, at dispersal bases (which include non-DoD installations from 
which Air National Guard and Air Reserve Forces operate) or in assigned 
operational areas, or explosive ordnance in the physical possession of the Air 
Force.”29  Reflecting the nature of ordnance that the Air Force primarily employs, 
Air Force EOD technicians are exceptionally well trained on US bombs and 
                                            
28 Dave Brown, et al, From Maintenance to Civil Engineering, Available from 
https://www.afcesa.af.mil/ceb/cebh/CEEOD4.html. Accessed on 25 March 2006. 
29 OPNAVINST 8027.1G, 2. 
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missiles, as well as aerial dispensers and their various payloads.  Due to the Air 
Force’s responsibility for Strategic Command’s nuclear arsenal, Air Force EOD 
technicians also maintain proficiency on all US nuclear weapons.  Though not a 
threat traditionally faced by Air Force EOD teams, air bases in Iraq have required 
the expansion of capabilities to include IED response. 
 
As a part of the Air Force’s civil engineering community, EOD flights are 
not considered combat service support units (though the blurred lines in Iraq 
have resulted in all forces experiencing combat to some degree).  Air Force EOD 
maintains a conventional response capability which is generally limited to air 
bases and the immediate vicinity.  Airmen in the EOD specialty do not have to 
meet heightened physical standards beyond those of the Air Force in general.  
Except for an isolated incident requiring Air Force EOD technicians to fast-rope 
onto the deck of the Mayaguez in support of a Marine boarding force, Air Force 
EOD flights, have not directly supported combat operations, nor do they maintain 
hyper-conventional mobility skills.30 
 
D. MARINE CORPS EOD 
 
Marine Corps EOD forces are organized into companies that fall under the 
Force Service Support Company within a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).  A 
Marine Corps EOD company is commanded by a captain and the marines are 
divided into teams of two or three technicians.  A major serves as the EOD officer 
on the MEF staff and coordinates operations throughout the MEF area of 
responsibility.  The MEF air wing has an EOD detachment assigned to it to 
provide services on the flight line.  This detachment is under the direct command 
of the air wing commander and does not report to the MEF EOD company. 
 
                                            
30 John F. Guilmartin, Jr, A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang, 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 78 and Roy Rowan, The Four Days of 
Mayaguez, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 195. 
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Marine Corps EOD forces are tasked with providing EOD services on 
Marine Corps installations, in assigned operational areas, or on explosive 
ordnance in the physical possession of the Marine Corps.31  Marine Corps EOD 
technicians maintain proficiency in all US and foreign ground ordnance and are 
often employed to clear small arms, grenade, and artillery ranges.  The situation 
in Iraq often requires the air wing EOD detachment to respond to IEDs and other 
requests off of their bases, as they are often the only EOD force in their base’s 
vicinity. 
 
Marine Corps EOD companies are combat service support units more 
closely aligned with engineering and construction units than combat forces.  
While all Marine units maintain proficiency in fast-roping, and Marine 
Expeditionary Units are certified as special operations-capable, Marine 
companies do not develop an ability to respond to scenarios in a hyper-
conventional way.  Responses require vehicles and tool-kits that, while much 
smaller than traditional truck-and-trailer loadouts, are still not man-portable. 
 
E. NAVY EOD 
 
Navy EOD forces are organized into two groups based on both the East 
and West coasts of the U.S. and are responsible for the EOD forces located 
roughly throughout each hemisphere.  Group ONE is based in Coronado, 
California and is responsible for the western hemisphere and Asia, and Group 
TWO, located in Little Creek, Virginia, is responsible for the Atlantic, Europe and 
the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf Region.  Each group currently shares 
responsibility for Iraq.  Navy EOD Groups comprise Mobile Units, based in areas 
of major naval concentration worldwide, which themselves comprise ten to fifteen 
deployable detachments.  The EOD detachment is the Navy’s primary 
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operational unit.  Non-deployable shore detachments are assigned to naval 
bases whose base operations require permanent EOD support. 
 
Consisting of eight technicians, led by a lieutenant or warrant officer, Navy 
EOD detachments are task oriented and mission-specific.  A small number of 
them are designated as Mine Counter-Measures (MCM) detachments whose 
members are specially trained and equipped to maintain a traditional sea-mine 
response capability.  The bulk of EOD detachments are designated as mobile 
detachments, whose members are trained and equipped for a broad array of 
explosive ordnance threats and procedures.  Mobile detachments are assigned 
to each Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group to respond to any 
ordnance emergencies on the flight decks or within weapons systems.  A 
growing number of mobile detachments are assigned to support Marine 
Expeditionary Forces in Iraq.  Referred to as MEF detachments, these units 
provide diving support to Marine forces operating on and over the lakes and 
waterways of Iraq, and are employed as IED response teams. 
 
Mobile Units TWO and THREE, located in Little Creek, VA, and Coronado, 
CA, respectively, maintain roughly half of their detachments as Naval Special 
Warfare (NSW) support detachments.  Designated as NSW Dets, these units are 
equipped and trained to provide support to SEALs in direct action missions.  
Their personal tactical gear is identical to that of the SEALs, and technicians on 
NSW Dets receive extra training in tactical shooting and small unit operations.  
After completion of individual and unit level EOD training at the Mobile Units, 
NSW Dets are operationally transferred to NSW squadrons for more unit and 
task force level training.  The NSW Dets then deploy as part of the NSW task 
force.  A select few detachments receive specialized training in direct action and 
counter-proliferation missions above and beyond that of NSW Dets and are 
assigned to support specifically designated Army Special Forces teams and 
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other special mission units worldwide.  Currently, thirty-five percent of the Navy’s 
EOD force is dedicated to direct support of SOFs.32 
 
Typical integration of EOD support into Army SF ODAs and SEAL 
platoons is to have one technician assigned per assaulting cell.33  In order to 
maximize tactical effectiveness and minimize any hindrances due to the 
integration of external personnel into the assaulting units, the technician is fully 
integrated into the cell for training and operations.  He is assigned a position 
within the assault team and flows with the cell through the objective.  This allows 
the technician to provide an immediate assessment of the situation.  It was 
quickly realized that excluding the EOD technician from the assaulting cell and 
having him remain outside the objective until it was “secured” was unrealistic.34  
The high speeds of raids and desire for a minimal time-on-target (TOT) meant 
that the EOD technician was constantly being called upon to conduct 
assessments and render any explosive threats safe before, after, and even 
during raids.  Upon completion of raids, many items at the objective must be 
identified and cleared if they are deemed to be hazardous.  This has resulted in 
the standard procedure of having the EOD technician lead the SSE.  Indeed, 
often SOF personnel do not enter rooms or approach vehicles until they have 
been cleared by an EOD technician.35 
 
The contributions made by an assigned EOD technician to one 
particular mission in Iraq is representative of the support typically provided 
to SOF missions.   
After the assaulting team dismounted their vehicles approximately 
one hundred yards from the objective, EOD cleared the primary 
and secondary breach points.  This was due to a suspicion of 
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booby-traps protecting each point.  Once the breach points were 
cleared, the assaulting team moved into position to launch the raid.  
Once begun, the speed of the assault was entirely dependent upon 
the technician’s clearance of doorways for possible booby-traps.  
Ordnance and IED caches were indeed found in two rooms at the 
objective.  SSE could not proceed nor could the objective be 
declared “secure” until the EOD technician cleared the caches.  As 
the battle progressed, an assault on a building adjacent to the 
objective could not proceed until a suspected IED that was blocking 
a stairway was cleared.  After a fire-and-maneuver action allowed 
access to the follow-on objective, another ordnance cache was 
discovered.  The EOD technician cleared the cache and other 
rooms at the follow-on objective while under fire.  Once the 
objectives were declared “secure,” EOD technicians directed the 
support element of conventional Army units in the movement of 
ordnance and weapons.  The supporting EOD technicians also 
cleared all items before their turnover to Army engineers.  Several 
more structures remained to be cleared by EOD before the site 
could be declared “secure” and the mission was completed.36 
 
In addition to direct support of combat missions, the EOD technicians who are 
integrated with SOFs in Iraq assist in the training of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorist 
Force (ICTF). 
 
After the basic joint course of instruction, Army, Air Force, and Marine 
students graduate and are qualified as Basic EOD technicians.  Navy trainees 
watch them proceed to their next commands while the sailors proceed to navy-
specific training.  This is another three months of demanding training in open- 
and closed-circuit diving operations and the neutralization and disposal of 
underwater explosive hazards.  Trainees are subjected to the most intensive 
practical exercises yet encountered, many lasting over four hours and requiring 
leadership and teamwork for successful completion.  Finally, after at least 51 
weeks (if every test is passed initially) – three months after the trainees of the 
other services have been qualified EOD technicians – Navy trainees graduate 
and are allowed to pin on the coveted EOD badge.  But while newly qualified 
                                            
36 Cuttitta, 2005. 
35 
technicians of other services proceed directly to operational units, Navy 
technicians have two months of follow-on training before they arrive at their 
operational commands. 
 
Navy follow-on training is conducted in San Diego, California, and consists 
of one month of jump training and one month of tactical training.  Jump training 
qualifies candidates in static-line and military free-fall (HALO/ HAHO) operations.  
Currently, roughly twenty-five percent of the force is airborne qualified.37 
Inclusion of jump training into the basic training pipeline of all Navy EOD 
technicians will result in the increase of airborne qualified personnel 
commensurate with accession rates.  Tactical training consists of developing 
hyper-conventional mobility skills such as fast-rope, rappel, and other helicopter 
insertion techniques.  Basic combat shooting is introduced.  Sailors also are 
trained in rubber raiding craft operations and small unit tactics, to include 
patrolling, land navigation, and immediate action drills.  Combat first aid also is 
covered. 
 
Sailors returning from NSW Det deployments may be assigned to other 
types of detachments.  This dispersion of experience, coupled with a concerted 
effort to “trickle-down” equipment and training from NSW Dets to mobile 
detachments and a basic training pipeline that includes parachuting and tactical 
operations has resulted in a hyper-conventionalization of Navy EOD.  Tactical 
shooting schools and evasive driver training, once offered only to NSW Dets, are 
rapidly becoming standard for all detachments.  SOF-specific weapons and 
tactical gear are standard issue for mobile detachments deploying on ships.  The 
intermingling of mobile detachment and NSW Det technicians facilitates the 
diffusion of SOF-support tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout the 
Navy EOD community.  
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Like the other services, Navy EOD forces are tasked with providing EOD 
services on naval installations, in assigned operational areas, or for explosive 
ordnance in the physical possession of the Navy.  They also are tasked to 
provide services within the oceans and contiguous waters up to the high water 
mark of coasts, inlets, bays, harbors, and rivers, as well as in any canals or 
enclosed bodies of water.  Further, Navy EOD forces are to “provide EOD 
services for rendering safe and disposing of explosive ordnance designed to be 
used underwater, except when it is in the physical possession of another 
service.”38 
 
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Like the Army’s EOD forces, Marine Corps EOD companies are combat 
service support units more closely aligned with engineering and construction 
units than combat forces.  Air Force EOD are organized and trained to provide 
critical services for airfield survivability and repair, but they are more removed 
from combat than the combat service support units of the Army and Marine 
Corps.  Navy EOD, in stark contrast, is a combat support force.  Its detachments 
are equipped and organized to directly support combat operations, and Navy 
EOD technicians possess the individual skills and equipment to be significant 
additions to combat operations.  In fact, a growing number of organizational skills 
and capabilities are hyper-conventional, reflecting the ongoing deployments of 
NSW Dets and the “trickle-down” effect of the collocation of SOF support and 
conventional units. 
                                            




















Helicopter Insertion X X
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft X
Open/Closed Circuit SCUBA X
Tactical Vehicle Operations X
Small Unit Tactics X X X
Tactical Shooting/ CQB X
 
Table 3.   Hyper-Conventional Capabilities Required for EOD Support of SOF 
 
 
Table 3 lists hyper-conventional skills and capabilities possessed by each 
service’s EOD forces.  It is clear that the Navy’s EOD community is the only one 
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IV. THROUGH PAST EXPERIENCE… TOWARD A SOLUTION 
As Chapter II indicated, many missions undertaken by SOF have the 
potential to place SOF personnel in situations where they are threatened by 
explosive hazards.  The unique and intensive training required to allow someone 
to safely identify, approach, and render these hazards safe is sufficient in most 
cases to ensure  an EOD technician is required.  Consequently, there exists a 
need for EOD technicians with “hyper-conventional” capabilities who can 
integrate seamlessly with SOF.  These capabilities include unorthodox insertion 
and extraction capabilities, unique mobility skills such as small boat or tactical 
vehicle operations, and individual skills such as tactical shooting, CQB, and small 
unit tactics. 
 
Chapter III showed that while each service branch maintains an EOD 
capability, they differ greatly in organization and capability.  While the small 
communities and hazardous nature of the work require all EOD technicians to 
work in small teams of two to four men, the organizational structures of the 
command and control elements tend to assume characteristics of their respective 
services.  Army EOD teams are organized into companies, themselves attached 
to battalions, and are trained and equipped to provide support to the combat 
service elements of large brigades or even divisions.  The Air Force EOD teams 
specialize in airfield clearance and are geared toward flight-line response 
involving aircraft ordnance.  Their airfield clearance mission has resulted in 
assignment to the Civil Engineering branch of the service, generally operating far 
from the front lines at secure airfields.  Marine Corps EOD is similar to the Army’s 
forces, assigned to combat service support and organized for support of large 
combat units.  Navy EOD, however, has developed quite differently from the 




A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVY EOD SUPPORT OF SOF 
 
Much has been written about the origins of military EOD and its origins in 
the intrepid British officers tackling unexploded German long time-delay fuzes in 
the streets of London during the blitz.  Draper Kauffman, an American and a 
graduate of the Naval Academy who had been denied a commission due to poor 
eyesight, through pluck and happenstance found himself a commissioned officer 
in the Royal Navy learning to defuse mines and bombs.  His experiences and 
exploits found their way across the Atlantic Ocean when he was recalled to the 
United States to open a mine and bomb disposal school in 1941.39 
  
The experiences of EOD forces after World War II are less well known, 
though that is not for lack of employment.  The now-ubiquitous use of explosive 
ordnance in martial exploits has resulted in the near constant, if unheralded, 
employment of EOD forces in every theater and combat operation since WWII.  
Indeed, the eager use of landmines and sub-munitions, as insidious and 
persistent as they are effective, has required many recurring deployments to 
areas of the world where hostilities have long since ended.  That busy history has 
led to the forces’ present involvement in OIF, the most EOD-intensive war to 
date.  The enemy's choice of IEDs as the primary weapon against the 
asymmetric might of the Coalition Forces has ensured that the vast majority of 
U.S. EOD forces see time in the desert sands of Iraq and that they will enjoy very 
little idle time while they are there.40  But a growing number of missions have not 
been discussed in literature: that of EOD support of SOF.   
  
The vast majority of EOD support to SOF missions, regardless of service 
branch, is provided by the U.S. Navy.  The sequence of events that led to Navy 
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EOD forces being the service of choice to provide EOD support to SOF has not 
been chronicled.41  It exists only in the memories of senior officers, some active 
and some retired, who experienced the operations first-hand.  Some are stories 
that surface anytime the "old salts" get together; others are still classified and are 
discussed only in confidence, if at all.  This thesis is not intended to exhaustively 
record every mission that involved EOD forces providing support to SOF.  
Rather, it is an account of significant events in the recent history of EOD.  Events 
that directly led to the awkward situation of EOD forces, who are not a part of the 
USSOCOM but are nevertheless an increasingly integral part of U.S. Special 
Operations, and the distinction of Navy EOD as the service of choice to provide 
that support. 
 
Navy EOD has been involved in special operations, to varying degrees, for 
decades.  It, rather than any other service’s organic EOD forces, is the service of 
choice when SOF require EOD support due in large part to an organizational and 
operational similarity to SOF units.  Specifically, Navy EOD possesses mobility 
skills, training and experience in various methods of insertion and extraction 
which mirror those of SOF.42  But these skills are not the result of leaders 
presciently identifying the direction of EOD.  No one foresaw the rise of terrorism 
and subsequent increase in special operations employment.  Nor did anyone 
embark on an effort to place the Navy EOD forces in a position where they 
possess the mobility skills that may be necessary decades down the road.  
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1. Origins in the British Experience 
 
a. Bomb Threat on the QUEEN ELIZABETH 2 
 
The first modern instance of direct EOD support to SOF occurred in 
1972.44  The British Counter-Revolutionary War (CRW) cell45 was alerted to a 
bomb threat onboard the luxury cruise liner Queen Elizabeth 2, underway 1300 
miles from shore enroute from New York to Southampton.  The bomber had 
called the New York office of Cunard Lines and threatened to detonate six bombs 
that had been smuggled aboard the 65,000-ton ship if he didn't receive $350,000.  
On May 18, an Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO)46, Captain R. Hacon 
Williams, who was untrained in military parachuting but had been on a handful of 
recreational jumps, responded to the request for jump-qualified ATOs by offering, 
“If the Colonel wished, he was willing to have a go.”47  He was paired with a 
Special Air Service (SAS) Staff Sergeant and two members of the Special Boat 
Service (SBS).  All three were SOF members who were highly trained in 
parachuting into the sea.   
 
In the team’s effort to reach the stricken cruise liner prior to the 
designated deadline, Captain Hacon was shuffled aboard and given parachute 
training while the C-130 Hercules transport plane made its way to the ship’s 
position.  Once there, despite poor weather affecting visibility of the sea’s 
surface, the four men jumped from an altitude of 800 feet into the North Atlantic.  
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They landed without incident 300 yards off the Queen Elizabeth 2’s bow and 
were quickly picked up by one of her small boats.  When the men reached the 
ship, they quickly conducted a thorough search of the vessel, which revealed the 
whole episode to be an elaborate hoax.  This incident went on to inspire the 1974 
Richard Lester feature film Juggernaut.48 
 
Despite the non-existence of the bombs, the experience had some 
lasting benefits.  It was the first time the SAS worked with British EOD in a 
special operation, a relationship that has since been improved and is now 
routine.  And the realization by British commanders that a similar event could 
easily occur again prompted them to resolve that there would always be a 
number of ATOs trained and equipped for parachuting into the sea.49   
 
It would not be long before the United States was faced with a 
small operation of its own that would require the integration of EOD personnel 
into a special operation.  On May 15, 1975, U.S. Marines launched a raid to 
recapture the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez, which had been seized three days 
earlier by the forces of Cambodia’s new Communist regime.50  The complex 
operation included a forty-eight-man boarding party that would storm over the 
vessel’s gunwales and overcome any Communist forces onboard.  Whether the 
ship was booby-trapped or not was unknown, and six Air Force EOD technicians 
were included in the assault to deal with any explosive threats encountered by 
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b. The Falklands War 
 
The next major event that challenged the mobility skills of EOD 
forces was the Falklands War.  In 1982, Britain and Argentina clashed in the 
south Atlantic in a dispute over the territorial clams of the Falklands island chain.  
It was a chance for Britain to test many new weapons platforms and doctrine, 
while Argentina mounted a significant struggle with aging weapons and decades-
old munitions.  Due partly to the age of the iron bombs dropped by the Argentine 
Air Force and partly to poor delivery tactics, a staggering eighty percent of 
Argentine bombs that hit their targets failed to explode.52  In all, ten British ships 
were hit with bombs that did not detonate. 53  The harrowing task of defusing the 
live ordnance fell to the clearance teams of the Royal Navy.  Throughout the 
conflict, these teams moved from ship to ship, each time descending into the 
deserted interior decks to defuse the unexploded 500- and 1000-pound bombs.54 
  
Getting these royal engineers to the unexploded bombs posed a 
new challenge: the ships could not come in to port with their unwanted and 
deadly cargo ready to explode at any moment, and they often were too small to 
have been equipped with helicopter landing pads.  Commanders realized the 
need to have experts that could rappel or otherwise be delivered by helicopter 
without the aircraft having to land.  These new skills decreased the time required 
for response, as the men now did not have to fly to the nearest ship that was 
large enough to be outfitted with a helicopter deck only to transfer once more to a 
small launch for the final movement to the stricken vessel.  They also increased 
the response options to smaller vessels operating in the shallower littoral waters. 
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This led to the addition of helicopter insertion techniques as a prerequisite for 
Royal Navy EOD forces.55 
 
2. U.S. Planners Learn From the British 
 
The U.S. Navy saw this and realized helicopter insertion techniques were 
a valuable skill for their own EOD personnel.56  Teams tasked with EOD 
response and support for an entire Carrier Battle Group or Amphibious 
Readiness Group were often billeted on the command ship with responsibility for 
all ships in the group.  The most expeditious method of movement to the site was 
by helicopter. Men were trained in rappelling and fast-roping, methods of 
insertion involving descending ropes suspended from a hovering helicopter.  
Subsequently, as a result of these insertion techniques, the normal EOD load-out 
had to be pared down.  No longer could responding technicians arrive on scene 
with the usual truck-and-trailer full of tools.  The unknown nature of the threat had 
always prompted teams to prepare for any eventuality, often loading their entire 
shop into the response vehicle.  This tactic worked well for relatively conventional 
responses to explosive threats on land.  But helicopter insertion to the rolling 
deck of a stricken vessel required a different approach.  The thousands of 
pounds of tools and gear that filled an extended cab truck and trailer had to be 
whittled down to what could be carried in a backpack by one man descending a 
rope.   
  
Later, with the British experience on the Queen Elizabeth 2 as evidence, 
the U.S. Navy determined that there was a requirement to move EOD personnel 
to vessels farther out to sea which may be acting autonomously and out of reach 
of helicopter assets, specifically submarines.57  The specter of a submarine, 
steaming thousands of miles from either land or the nearest navy ship, having a 
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problem with explosive ordnance was haunting.  While the technically advanced 
designs of modern torpedoes, missiles, and mines carried aboard submarines 
made the likelihood of a problem very remote, the prospect of something 
happening that would require a submarine to steam hundreds or thousands of 
miles on the ocean's surface to reach EOD expertise required a new capability.  
Select Navy EOD units were then given parachute training for the specific 
mission of jumping into the ocean in the vicinity of a stricken submarine.58 
 
Though conventional response was still a maintained and exercised 
capability, indeed it was still the primary skill set, Navy EOD was gaining 
additional skills and experience that would result in a leaner, more responsive 
tactical element resembling the small, autonomous, light and self-sufficient teams 
of Special Operations.  They were already proficient at SCUBA diving, swimmer 
cast and recovery (a core competency for mine countermeasures operations) 
and quickly building the capability to parachute and insert by helicopter.59 As a 
result, the expansive load-out of heavy tools specifically designed for every 
eventuality and the techniques and procedures that corresponded to them would 
no longer suffice.  Now the United States had EOD technicians who could dive, 
jump, and insert by helicopter in small groups with the tools that were anticipated 
to be necessary carried on their backs.  The units developed the tactics, 
techniques and procedures to make full use of the unorthodox insertion methods.  
And it would not be long before they were put to the test. 
 
3. Operation EARNEST WILL 
 
In 1987, the United States launched Operation EARNEST WILL (OEW), 
an effort to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers, which had been falling prey to Iranian mine 
and small boat attacks, under the American flag.  The re-flagged vessels now 
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rated American protection, and the U.S. found itself plunged into a “quasi-war” 
with Iran.  To counter Iranian nighttime small boat and mining attacks, Army SOF 
helicopters and Naval Special Warfare assets (SEALs and Special Boat Units) 
were deployed to the Persian Gulf in August of that year.  Navy EOD technicians 
were among the SOF task force.  Two of the three SOF actions launched during 
the fall of 1987 that effectively ended both the Iranian’s ability and their will to 
mount another serious attack in the northern Persian Gulf relied heavily upon the 
support provided by EOD personnel.  These were the capture of the minelayer 
Iran AJR and the destruction of the Rostam oil platform.60   
 
Iran AJR was a 2,275-ton roll-on roll-off cargo ship modified for laying 
mines.  On September 21, 1987, three Army SOF helicopters responded to 
reports of possible mine-laying activity by the vessel and witnessed her crew 
launching mine-like objects in international waters.  The helicopters subsequently 
engaged Iran AJR with 2.75-in rockets and 7.62mm mini-guns, and they 
succeeded in destroying her propulsion plant and rudder.  The next day, a 
boarding party that consisted of a SEAL platoon supported by a Farsi translator, 
a Marine Force Reconnaissance team, and a Navy EOD element prepared to 
board the vessel that was now dead in the water.  The SEALs met no resistance 
from the remaining crew (most of the crew was dead or had abandoned ship, 
only to be rescued by U.S. Navy ships).  The EOD technicians followed the 
SEALs onto Iran AJR and secured the remaining mines and gathered valuable 
intelligence about Iran’s mine laying operations.  After the trove of intelligence 
onboard (including charts marked with minefields, war plans, and nine M-08 
naval mines) was gathered and analyzed, the SOF task force, including the EOD 
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element, sank Iran AJR on September 26, 1987.  The evidence gathered made it 
impossible for Iran to credibly continue to deny that it had mined international 
waters. 61 
 
On 15 October, 1987, the Iranians hit the British-owned merchant ship 
Sungari with a Silkworm missile launched from the Fao Peninsula.  The Reagan 
Administration considered several retaliatory attacks of varying degrees of 
intensity, but eventually settled upon destroying the Rashadat oil platforms.62  
The same SEAL task unit that had captured the Iran AJR was tasked with the 
destruction of the platforms.  The task unit commander immediately requested 
the addition of six EOD technicians, including one who was experienced in 
destroying oil platforms.63  Once the SEALs had chosen the particular platform 
that would be targeted, they would board and secure it.  Once secured, the 
SEALs and EOD technicians would set explosive charges to cut the platform’s 
structural legs and cross members, toppling it into the sea.  If resistance was 
encountered, the SEALs would engage the Iranians while EOD planted the 
charges.64 
 
As it happened, the Iranian crew abandoned both platforms when the 
approaching task force broadcast warnings in English and Farsi.  The crew of a 
platform two nautical miles to the north manned their weapons, and then 
abandoned their platform when they were challenged.  The naval ships of the 
task force then bombarded the two Rashadat platforms, collapsing one and 
heavily damaging the other.  The SEALs and EOD technicians approached the 
damaged platform to finish the work of toppling it, racing against the oil-fueled 
fires that raged on the surface of the water due to the bombardment.  The EOD 
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team quickly deduced the best placement of their explosive charges given the 
damage already inflicted upon the platform and began placing their haversacks.  
The SEALs were redirected to board the platform whose crew had manned their 
weapons earlier, and they left the EOD team to complete the rigging of the 
explosives and finish destroying the platform.65  Destruction of the Rashadat oil 
platforms finally convinced Iran that they could not attack merchant vessels in the 
Persian Gulf and, though OEW and the American presence continued until early 
1989, Iran never mounted another serious attack in the northern Persian Gulf.66 
 
4. EOD Support of SOF Develops Through the 1990s 
 
In the early 1990s theater commanders-in-chief (now called combatant 
commanders) began to designate specific Army SOF units to be tasked with 
rapid response to threats in the event specialized national assets could not 
respond.  The units also were authorized limited authority to deal with foreign 
nuclear weapons.  A Navy EOD detachment was tasked with providing the 
necessary technical support to the European theater’s designated unit.  In 
cooperation with other government agencies, the Navy detachment allowed the 
European theater’s Commander-in-Chief to field a broad array of new capabilities 
that were previously unavailable to him until the arrival of domestic national 
assets.67  The value of an EOD capability organic to these units was proven 
during an exercise in Poland when the target building, an abandoned Soviet 
facility, was discovered to be surrounded by real landmines.  The embedded 
EOD forces safely removed the mines, allowing the exercise to continue.68 
 
The value of EOD forces being attached to SOF was proven again in 
Bosnia.  Though fought largely as an air campaign, special operators on the 
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ground conducted direct action raids, special reconnaissance missions, and 
searched for and captured high-value targets.  Many missions included the 
insertion of sniper teams onto Serbian rooftops to act as an over-watch for raids 
conducted in the streets below.  Due to the Serbian affinity for booby-traps and 
intelligence of explosive threats on rooftops, the missions were nearly cancelled 
for fear of the snipers’ safety.  Navy EOD teams in the area offered to insert with 
the snipers and clear any booby-traps that they encountered.  The missions were 
approved and the EOD technicians disarmed the explosive threats, allowing for 
the safe execution of the missions.69 
 
5. Recent Operations 
 
The mobility skills that have become institutionalized within Navy EOD 
forces have had more recent consequences, as well.  Early in OIF, Task Force 
3/75 Ranger conducted a night combat parachute assault to seize a remote 
desert landing strip in the western Iraqi desert.  It was the first Ranger combat 
parachute assault since Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.70  Early in the 
planning stages of the assault, dirt mounds and barrels on the runway were 
assessed by intelligence agencies to likely be booby-trapped or protected by 
IEDs.  A requirement for a supporting EOD team was included in the plan.71  
Prior to the decision to assault by parachute was made, an agreement had been 
reached by the Navy and Army EOD teams that were each being considered to 
support the raid.  If the assault was to be conducted by ground, the Army EOD 
team would go; if the assault was to be airborne, the Navy would support it.72  
The assault was indeed determined to be by parachute, and the Navy team, the 
only EOD personnel who were airborne qualified, loaded into the Air Force 
special operations MC-130 Combat talon aircraft and, along with 199 Army 
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Rangers, jumped from an altitude of 800 feet under zero illumination 
conditions.73  On the ground, the EOD technicians searched and cleared dozens 
of mounds and obstacles, allowing the airfield to be used throughout Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM.  
 
Innumerable other SOF missions in support of Operations ENDURING 
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM continue to require the support of EOD 
technicians. SOF teams on direct action missions targeting bombers and bomb-
makers often encounter booby-traps and IEDs at the target sites. Enemy 
weapons caches are found daily by SOFs in caves in the Afghan mountains and 
hidden in the Iraqi desert. 
 
B. THE SOLUTION EMERGES 
 
Much of the EOD support required as a result of special operations, such 
as the destruction of arms caches, can be provided by the conventional EOD 
teams with responsibility for the area in which the missions requiring support are 
conducted.  These teams are, however, in high demand and often cannot 
respond for hours or even days.  The skills of these technicians are well-honed, 
but some special operations exist outside the capabilities of conventional EOD.  
Raids may require EOD personnel to be on-scene to respond immediately or 
may even require the bomb technician be integrated into the assaulting force.  
Such missions require “hyper-conventional” capabilities such as training in close 
quarters battle and shooting skills.  Other operations may require proficiency in 
dangerous, unique or unorthodox insertion or extraction methods.  Due to a few 
significant events in the recent history of military explosive ordnance disposal, 
Navy EOD has developed and honed those “hyper-conventional” skills that have 
resulted in it consistently and habitually being chosen as the service of choice to 
provide EOD support to SOF. 
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Integration with NSW began informally within Carrier and Amphibious 
Strike Group deployments.  Navy EOD detachments assigned to support the 
strike groups were able to provide critical EOD support to the SEAL platoons that 
were also assigned to the strike groups.  The successful partnership was made 
more formal when Navy EOD detachment support was included in the NSW 21 
Strategy in 2000.  Similarly, the informal support of specific Army SF teams 
worldwide – begun as a result of operational necessity and the initiative of 
tactical commanders to act upon their recognition that Navy EOD technicians 
would most easily integrate into their operations – has become more 
institutionalized.  Support to Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) 
began in September, 1996, with a tasking by the Geographical Combatant 
Commander and was included in the force listing in the theater Concept Plan in 




Operational necessity has required Navy technicians to be trained in 
SCUBA and closed-circuit diving, all manners of insertion and extraction by 
helicopter, parachuting, and small boat operations.  Further, sailors who 
volunteer for EOD tend to have characteristics similar to those of SOF personnel.  
These are men and women who are drawn to life on a small team and the 
excitement of jumping, diving, shooting, and working with explosives.  They are 
also not deterred by the dangers inherent in the mission.  The individual traits of 
Navy EOD technicians, coupled with the community’s organization as combat 
support, as opposed to combat service support, result in a remarkable similarity 
between Navy EOD detachments and SOF teams.  For these reasons, Navy 
EOD is an obvious choice as the force to provide EOD support to SOF.  Indeed, 
Navy EOD has provided support to SOF for years to varying degrees.  The 
support provided has been overwhelmingly successful and has allowed Navy 
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EOD to be a critical enabler to many special operations.  As a result of this 
success, requests for EOD support of SOF operations will surely continue to 


























V.  MAKING IT WORK: THE DECISION TO INTEGRATE EOD  
SUPPORT AND OVERCOMING RESULTANT OBSTACLES 
The integration of external support into tactical units poses unique and 
interesting challenges.  Factors involving the costs versus the benefits of 
integration, the intelligence that is necessary when deciding whether or not to 
integrate, and resultant issues of trust are all relevant. 
 
A. THE DECISION TO INTEGRATE EOD INTO SOF: AN APPLICATION 
OF GAME THEORY 
 
Ultimately, a commander’s decision of whether or not to integrate EOD 
personnel into their tactical teams is based on an analysis of the costs versus 
benefits of doing so.  A commander is more likely to include an EOD capability in 
his assault force if the costs of doing so can be minimized while still maintaining 
the benefits.  An application of mathematical game theory to a particular scenario 
involving barricaded terrorists and an assaulting SOF (Appendix A) can illustrate 
how prior planning and forward thinking can reduce the costs of integrating 
external personnel into a tactical unit.  A complimentary result of the application 
of game theory of particular interest to commanders of elite units is the analysis 
of the terrorists’ decision process.  It is apparent that, given the requisite 
resources and materials, it is always in the terrorists’ favor to pose an explosive 
threat. 
 
In 2004, Carlos Perez published his thesis, “Anatomy of a Hostage 
Rescue: What makes a hostage rescue successful?”  In it, he relied heavily upon 
Game Theory to conclude that the best strategy for a government facing 




negotiate.75   Building upon his conclusion, and expanding his parameters, this 
thesis analyzes the actions of the terrorists and SOF after the decision to assault 
has been made.  Specifically, should the terrorists pose an explosive threat, 
placing IEDs and booby-traps at points of entry and along the assaulting force’s 
expected paths of movement, and should the assaulting force commander 
integrate an EOD capability into his team at the expense of team cohesion and 
orchestrated precision? 
 
Once a government makes the decision to take a hard-line stance against 
a barricaded enemy, a new game emerges. Knowing an assault is forthcoming, 
the barricaded terrorist must now decide if he wants to impose an explosive 
threat (assuming the technical knowledge and supplies are available) to the 
assaulting force such as booby-traps or IEDs placed at likely points of entry and 
along likely paths of movement.  The tactical unit commander, once ordered to 
prepare for an assault, must decide whether or not to integrate an EOD capability 
into his assault force.  If an explosive threat is encountered, an integrated EOD 
capability will likely allow the assault to continue and will save lives.  If there is no 
explosive threat, however, integration of outside personnel into the assaulting 
force will interrupt the precise teamwork necessary to achieve relative superiority 
in Close Quarters Battle (CQB) and maintain momentum through the target. 
 
Game theory principles reveal that the terrorists have a dominant strategy 
of posing an explosive threat, and the SOF can be assumed to respond to this 
strategy and maximize their own payoff by integrating an EOD capability into the 
assaulting force.  This is the likely outcome of this zero-sum game.  But when the 
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strategic combinations are assigned relative utilities and ranked accordingly, 
analysis of the resulting game is more telling. 
 
The relative strength of the terrorists’ dominant strategy of posing an 
explosive threat is very strong, regardless of which strategy the SOF employs.  
The SOF’s dominant strategy, on the other hand, is of only marginal strength.  It 
is interesting and worthwhile to note, however, that those characteristics that 
detract from the payoff value of the integration strategy for the SOF – such as the 
interruption of the precise teamwork that is necessary to achieve relative 
superiority in CQB and maintain momentum through the target – are trainable.  
As such, those things, and the corresponding payoff value of integration, can be 
improved.  As SOF units and EOD support personnel train jointly the payoff value 
of the integration strategy approaches that of the non-integration strategy.  At its 
peak, when the two units are seamlessly integrated and indiscernable from one 
another, the payoff values are equal in the case that the terrorists do not pose an 
explosive threat.  In the case that they do pose such a threat, the payoff 
substantially increases.  The utility of this strategic combination to SOFs 
(integrating EOD personnel when terrorists pose an explosive threat) is not 
maximized merely because there is more danger (despite the integrated 
capability to neutralize it), which makes this outcome of less utility than those 
when the terrorists do not pose any explosive threat at all.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the payoff value the SOF can guarantee itself is solely dependent 
upon the degree to which supporting EOD forces are integrated. 
 
B. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IN THE DECISION TO 
INTEGRATE EOD FORCES INTO SOF 
 
Commanders facing the decision to integrate often have an incomplete 
picture of the threat and must rely on intelligence analysis to fill in any gaps.  
Analysis is only as good as the information being analyzed; which information is 
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relevant and which is not is a fundamental question that must be answered 
before any conclusions can be drawn.  In this case, real-time tactical data and 
historical trends are of equal salience and, when analyzed correctly, can allow a 
commander to make the best decision. 
 
For a tactical unit commander, the decision to integrate EOD technicians 
into the assault team is an important one.  Adding external personnel to the 
tactical team raises safety issues when the supporting EOD unit has not trained 
with the assault force in realistic scenarios and will almost certainly add to the 
response time of the tactical unit.  However, the decision not to include an EOD 
capability in the assault team can have dire consequences, as well.  If the 
targets, whether they are terrorists or barricaded fugitives, have determined to 
defend themselves with booby-traps or IEDs positioned along anticipated routes 
of entry, EOD support is critical.  In these cases, the explosive threat can pose a 
serious hazard to the assaulting unit and can delay progress to the target, deny 
access to critical areas, or even result in friendly casualties. 
 
Sometimes the decision is easy.  Intelligence may be readily available, as 
in the case of a specific threat.  The airborne response to the Queen Elizabeth 2 
by three British commandos and a bomb expert in 1972 was in reaction to a 
specific threat to the luxury cruise liner.76  The British SAS assault on the Iranian 
embassy in London in 1980 included an integrated EOD capability because there 
was a specific threat to blow up the building.77  U.S. Navy EOD technicians were 
included in the Ranger parachute assault on the airfield near Kandahar, 
Afghanistan, because of intelligence that suspicious mounds of earth on the 
tarmac were likely booby-trapped.78  In these cases, the intelligence was readily 
forthcoming that there were specific explosive threats. Indeed, in the cases of 
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terrorism, the information was offered by the targets themselves.  In such an 
instance, the tactical commander is well-served to include EOD personnel in the 
assault unit. 
 
But sometimes the right choice is less clear.  The tactical commander may 
have neither a specific threat nor a historical precedent leading him to include 
EOD personnel in the tactical operation.  It is in these situations that intelligence 
and analysis become essential.  The role of intelligence in these cases is not to 
determine if an explosive hazard exists.  Bomb squads and EOD personnel are 
generally able to respond within a reasonable amount of time in the event the 
tactical team happens upon an explosive hazard at the target site.  Rather, the 
goal must be to determine if those explosive hazards pose a real and direct 
threat to the assaulters.  The operational commander of the tactical team needs 
to know if there is a threat to the assaulting force that would require integration of 
EOD personnel into the assault train.  This requires sufficient intelligence and 
analysis to determine if a credible threat exists. 
 
1. Determining the Credibility of the Threat 
 
A threat can be deemed to be credible if the person or group issuing the 
threat possess both the intent and capability to carry out the threat.79  Both 
characteristics are necessary for credibility; neither by itself is sufficient.  A threat 
may have sufficient intent behind it: the person or group issuing the threat may 
have the necessary desire and self-justification to blow up the threatened target.  
But without the capability to actually do so, such a threat is only bluster.  
Likewise, an organization may have the technical means and supplies to pose an 
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explosive threat, but without the intent to do so there is little likelihood of it being 
carried out.  It is the purpose of intelligence to qualify both characteristics.   
 
2. Determining Group Intentions 
 
In analyzing the intentions behind the threat, the intelligence apparatus 
must attempt to determine the issuing person or group’s motivation, history and 
behavior pattern, and current activity.80  The person or group must be motivated 
to commit the threatened act.  If there is a specific doctrine known to the 
intelligence community, was there a catalyst? The specific motivation of the 
person or group is generally not relevant to tactical operations, as the event has 
already occurred and, for whatever reason, has resulted in the target package 
that the tactical commander faces.  But analysis of motivation is useful in 
determining which groups should be the target of strategic threat assessments. 
 
History and behavior patterns can be very important, as past behavior 
often determines future action.  In the Bosnian campaign, the Serbs’ penchant for 
booby-trapping rooftops and other key terrain features was well known, and 
commanders had to include EOD forces with tactical teams in order to neutralize 
this threat.81  Frequent assaults on bomb-maker’s houses and workshops in Iraq 
have established the standing threat of IEDs and booby-traps when these targets 
are “taken down” by SOF.  The need for EOD support in these situations is 
understood.  Likewise, experience in assaulting methamphetamine labs have 
proven the prudence of police SWAT teams including Bomb Squad personnel in 
their tactical operations against such targets.  
 
Current activity is the most salient characteristic of a person or group’s 
intent.  Is there evidence that the individual or organization has been actively                                             
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pursuing explosives or acquisition of bombs and bomb-making materials?  Even 
the absence of specific intelligence regarding the tactical problem faced by SOF 
(for example, the sighting of a bomb or a freed hostage reporting the use of 
booby-traps) is dominated by intelligence revealing the pursuit of explosives.   
 
3. Determining Group Capabilities 
 
When analyzing the capabilities of the threatening organization or person, 
the intelligence apparatus must look at four areas: technology, force structure, 
mobility, and geographic access.82  Intelligence officials must attempt to 
determine the types of hardware and software to which the group has had 
access. In prosecuting the GWOT, the groups SOF would be directed to engage 
can be assumed to universally have access to explosives of one sort or another.  
State-sponsored terrorist organizations can be assumed to have access to 
military grade explosives.  Well-established and financed groups can be 
assumed to have access to explosives, homemade, military surplus, or 
otherwise.   
 
In examining the force structure of the target, the intelligence community 
must focus on whether the group has organic explosives experience or if it is 
dependent upon outside expertise.  This information, coupled with any 
intelligence about the locations and recent actions of any identified experts, can 
aid the tactical commander in assessing the nature of the explosive threat that 
faces his team.   
 
Mobility as a capability refers more to strategic threat assessments of 
potential future threats, rather than an identified threat that has taken place or is 
occurring to which the tactical team has been called.  The question of whether or 
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not the group has transportation sufficient to move itself along with any 
explosives and other arms to a target site has been answered by the time the 
tactical unit is called to respond.  Lastly, when a threat is received, the 
intelligence apparatus must discern whether or not the group has access to the 
geographic area or facility.  This aspect, like motivation and mobility, tends to 
have been overtaken by events from the tactical leader’s point of view if the 
threatening person or group already occupies the target site.  But it can have 
great impact if the threat is removed from the threatened area, as was the case 
on the Queen Elizabeth 2.83 
 
The notional sum of the analyses of intentions and capabilities can allow 
the intelligence community and tactical commander to determine whether or not 
there is a credible explosive threat that would demand the integration of EOD 
forces into the tactical element.   
 
C. ADDRESSING TRUST ISSUES THAT RESULT FROM THE DECISION 
TO INTEGRATE EOD FORCES INTO SOF 
 
The high-risk scenarios that are common operating environments of SOF 
result in high levels of trust being of paramount importance.  Joint training and 
drills requiring integration of EOD experts into elite units markedly eases initial 
trust issues and allows obstacles to integration to be surmounted.  Each member 
is dependent upon the others for their safety and often find themselves in life-
and-death situations, the escape from which requires unfettered trust in each 
other.  Situations requiring the integration of external support, such as EOD 
technicians, into the SOF are by definition those that require expertise that lies 
outside the organic capabilities of the unit.  Such situations are apt to raise the 
collective consciousness of the team to the dangers that are faced, and also 
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reinforce the disconcerting notion that, despite their considerable training, there 
exist obstacles for which they are not prepared.  Without previous training or 
integration, it is into this atmosphere of heightened fears and tightened circles of 
trust that an EOD technician must insert himself.   
 
Historically, the weapons of choice used by terrorists have been 
explosives and firearms; however, in recent years terrorists have sought and, in 
some cases, have obtained the capability to use other types of more effective 
weapons.84  Multi-threat scenarios involving hazardous materials have been 
encountered by civilian SWAT units for years and lately have been increasing in 
frequency.85  This trend will spread to military units engaged in operations in 
support of the GWOT and specifically to tactical units within USSOCOM.  It is a 
fact that “the presence of these dangerous materials during tactical operations … 
presents unique hazards and risks that require special precautions.”86  Units 
trained in dealing with the CBRNE hazards that are now posed by terrorists 
already exist, and many are commanded by or “on-loan” to USSOCOM.  But 
integration into the tactical teams, where the hazards will be initially encountered, 
is scarce.  Tactical teams, EOD technicians, and Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) 
units (known as Technical Escort or Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments) 
will be called upon to cooperate with growing frequency.  An EOD technician’s 
training in chemical and radiological detection, containment, and 
decontamination procedures allow him to act as a frontline expert with the ability 
to reach-back to the more robustly-equipped Technical Escort unit.  An EOD 
technician’s training and expertise in rendering safe explosive devices likely to be 
encountered by a tactical team make his integration into the tactical element 
necessary.  But how does an outside support element successfully integrate into 
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an existing elite tactical team that has trained to the point that its members act as 
one?   
 
1. Tight Bonds and Effective Teamwork 
 
Elite tactical teams form exceptionally tight bonds.  Often, their member’s 
professional and social network ties are the same.  Team members work 
together and relax together.  In the case of military units that deploy for many 
months at a time, they even live together.  These bonds are strengthened by the 
stresses encountered during the course of a mission.  Special Forces units and 
police special operations teams exist and are trained to execute missions beyond 
the capabilities of conventional forces.  Often, these missions involve very high 
levels of personal danger and precise execution of specific roles by each team 
member.  Training offers only minimal sanctuary from danger, as hostile forces 
are not involved, but drills often are conducted with live ammunition under the 
most realistic of circumstances to maintain the highest levels of proficiency.  CQB 
requires extreme muzzle control and surgical precision.  Often gunshots are 
inches from a teammate’s body.  Such precision is only attained through many 
hours of practice and the firing of thousands of bullets. 
 
The bonds formed between members of a tactical team who as a matter of 
course must depend upon one another to live become very strong indeed.  The 
transient nature of military life results in permanent change of duty stations every 
few years, with corresponding changes in team chemistry.  Operational units are 
continually being created, trained, deployed, and then broken up again.  This 
personnel rotation would seem to impede the formation of tight bonds, and it 
does to an extent, but the common backgrounds provided by rigorous selection 
processes, qualification, and training courses allows for trust to be established 
very quickly among operators.  Trust bonds are strengthened within military units 
again when they deploy to remote areas of the world and must live in what are 
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often very hostile conditions for months.  Police units, in contrast, are rarely 
broken due to rotating personnel.  Membership can be very static on SWAT 
teams, often with members working together for many years.  This longevity 
allows teammates to become very familiar with each other and complicated 
maneuvers to become second nature.   
 
The success of a highly trained tactical unit, whether it is a military unit or 
a police SWAT team, comes from frequent, intense, and realistic training and the 
knowledge that each member’s life is in the hands of the others.  Indeed, each 
person knows and accepts that he is responsible at any time for the life of each 
of his teammates.  The constant drilling results in a surgical precision, each man 
knowing what the other is going to do in any circumstance.  All the conceivable 
unknowns in any situation are identified and rehearsed, ensuring the absolute 
best chance of success.  The team works as one entity, a fluid and precise wave 
of fantastic force that is meant to overwhelm the target, so that the defensive 
advantage is overcome by surprise, speed, and firepower. 
 
But even the fastest team cannot outrun an explosion.  Booby-traps and 
other explosive hazards can stop even the best-trained teams in their tracks.  
Stacks – operators arranged in single file during an assault – move so quickly 
when clearing rooms that the first two or three men may become casualties 
before the train’s momentum can be stopped.  The unfortunate reality is that 
without prior intelligence of an explosive threat, it is the entry man, first through 
the door, who will find a booby-trap.  Tactically, a bomb maker’s house in 
Baghdad and a methamphetamine lab in Seattle pose the same problem: a 
target inside a structure with a very high probability that it is defended by 
explosive hazards (booby-traps, tripwires, IEDs) meant to kill any unwanted 
guest.  Whether the mission is the apprehension of a high value target or the 
recovery of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), a tactical team will require the 
assistance of an EOD technician.  An EOD technician is trained to counter the 
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explosive threat.  Once that threat is determined to exist, and access is denied as 
a result, the EOD technician must be incorporated into the tactical team to defeat 
the threat, enable access, and allow the mission to continue. 
 
2. Initial Trust 
 
A forward-thinking unit commander will recognize the need for integration 
with specialized support elements and develop a training plan that includes 
experts in areas in which his team’s tactical training is deficient.  A more realistic 
case is a tactical unit that suddenly finds itself faced with a threat outside the 
range of skills possessed organically.  In such a case, the experts are called in, 
and an ad-hoc relationship is formed between the elite unit and the support 
element.  The operative trust in a case such as this is “initial trust,” reflecting the 
fact that the relationship is improvised and that the parties have not worked 
together long enough to develop an interaction history.87  The power to influence 
the situation required of an expert brought in to support a tactical operation when 
a relationship does not exist is based solely upon expertise.  This power and 
resulting trust is tenuous and unstable, and it can be lost at the slightest 
appearance of incompetence or naiveté. 
 
Trust theorists have postulated that trust grows over time, implicitly 
assuming that trust levels begin small.88  Empirical data suggests otherwise, 
however, as is exemplified by elite tactical units.  This paper’s definition of trust is 
that one believes in, and is willing to depend on, another party in a time of 
vulnerability.  It follows then that the definition of initial trust is that trust between 
parties that is not based on any kind of experience with, or firsthand knowledge 
of, the other party.  Rather, it is based on an individual’s disposition to trust or on 
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institutional cues that enable one person to trust another without firsthand 
knowledge.89  This is true for the team that has no prior training with supports 
elements such as EOD.  Yet, in a tactical situation, team members must place 
their lives in the hands of such outside support elements, often having just met 
the technician.  This requires an exceptional amount of trust in the best of 
circumstances, exceedingly so in the case of initial trust. 
 
The High Level Model of Initial Formation of Trust (Figure 1) implies that 
trust forms partly because of one’s disposition to trust.  “Disposition to trust” 
refers to a tendency to be willing to depend on others; “a person exhibits a 
disposition to trust to the extent she or he demonstrates a consistent tendency to 
be willing to depend on others across a broad spectrum of situations and 
persons.”90  Operators on tactical teams demonstrate their willingness to depend 
upon one another as a matter of course.  They could not accomplish their 
missions if they did not.  But does this disposition to trust extend to others 
outside the team?  It must.  When faced with an explosive threat that denies 
access to the tactical team operating within its normal skill set, the EOD 
technician who is brought in to support the team must be trusted immediately.  
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Figure 1.   The High-Level Model of Initial Formation of Trust (From McKnight, et 
al, 474) 
 
Fortunately, two factors assist in the rapid formation of initial trust in such 
a situation.  The first is the fact that there are two types of dispositions to trust 
based on personality traits, one of which is relevant to the elite unit: faith in 
humanity.  “Faith in humanity” means that others are typically well-meaning and 
reliable.91  The people elite military units and police SWAT teams come into 
contact with during the course of their missions are terrorists, criminals, and in 
general those who have decided to live outside the bounds of society.   Given 
their frequent and adversarial contact with such people, team members may 
appear the most unlikely of those to exhibit faith in humanity.  But if the term is 
altered to be “faith in operators,” it becomes relevant and descriptive.  Operators 
tend to trust operators.  Beyond the common training and backgrounds 
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membership in tactical units implies, a factor discussed below, operators tend to 
be like-minded people who can find some amount of shared experiences or 
beliefs that exist even across disciplines.  It is this commonality of personal traits, 
in part, that allows high levels of initial trust to exist.  A member of an elite tactical 
team exhibits a general faith in those who can be called operators within their 
own fields because of a general faith in all operators which is, in essence, a faith 
in themselves.   
 
The second factor that results in exceptionally high levels of initial trust of 
an outsider by a tactical team is that of institution-based trust.  This type of trust 
means that “one believes the necessary impersonal structures are in place to 
enable one to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavor.”  Specifically, 
“structural assurances, defined as the belief that success is likely because such 
contextual conditions as promises, contracts, regulations, and guarantees are in 
place.”92  The structural assurances relevant to the formation of initial trust in a 
tactical situation are qualifications.  The tactical unit requiring the support of an 
outside expert, such as an EOD technician, knows that they can be confident that 
person has been through the necessary training to be qualified within his field.  
The wearing of a badge or insignia is an immediately recognizable way to convey 
the expertise a technician possesses.  The tactical team need not know what the 
training consists of or what exact qualifications are possessed by the supporting 
EOD technician, and often they don’t.  But the fact that the team requested EOD 
support and the technician responds with the expertise necessary, as exemplified 
by the EOD qualification badge, allows the team to place a large amount of trust 
in the technician.  It is this institution-based trust, as a result of structural 
assurances, coupled with a disposition to trust other operators, that results in the 
high levels of initial trust required of an elite tactical unit in a supporting element.   
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Two categorization processes that further enable high levels of trust are 
reputation categorization and stereotyping.  Reputation in this instance reflects 
professional competence as “those with good reputations are categorized as 
trustworthy individuals.”93  A person may be perceived as a competent individual 
because he or she is a member of a competent group or because of her or his 
actions. In the case of an EOD technician supporting a tactical unit, the 
competency of the EOD unit or bomb squad of which the technician is a member 
contributes to the reputation of the individual.  Though the members of the 
tactical team may not have any firsthand knowledge of the technician personally, 
there is a good chance that many team members have had interactions with 
members of the bomb squad and will transfer the reputation of the group onto the 
technician.  Therefore, if the individual has a good reputation, one will quickly 
develop trusting beliefs about that individual, even without firsthand knowledge.  
Stereotyping reflects prejudices for or against occupational groups (such as 
bomb squads). 
 
By positive stereotyping, one can quickly form positive trusting beliefs 
about the other by generalizing from the favorable category into which the person 
was placed.  In the initial relationship, categorization processes that place the 
other person in a positive grouping will tend to produce high levels of trusting 
beliefs.94 
 
This initial trust allows the members of a tactical team to place their lives 
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3. The Advantages of Joint Training 
 
If the elite tactical team’s commander is forward-thinking, as suggested 
above, he will anticipate situations that require expertise outside of his team’s 
skill set.  “Many public safety special operations teams are routinely cross 
training to some extent so that they can support one another with various areas 
of expertise.  Cross-training usually focuses on learning terminology, special 
hazards and risks, capabilities, and standard operating procedures.”95  Cross-
training does not mean that the tactical team learns how to render safe an 
explosive device, nor that the EOD technician becomes an expert in CQB.  It 
does mean, however, that the tactical team becomes aware of how to integrate 
the unique capabilities of the EOD technician and that the technician can 
cooperate as seamlessly as possible with tactical operations.   
 
A unique aspect to the tactical team operating jointly is the fact that power 
must transfer according to the threat.  This flow of power can be described as it 
pertains to tactical operations: 
In situations where the location is vacant and there is a possibility 
of chemicals being involved, an experienced Hazmat technician 
must be involved in the entry.  The bomb technician should enter 
first, looking for explosive hazards.  Once the area is cleared and 
rendered safe, the Hazmat tech enters looking for chemical 
hazards … When rendering safe the explosive the bomb squad 
takes the lead; when dealing with a chemical hazard, the Hazmat 
team takes the lead.  When … the location is known to be occupied 
SWAT should enter first to secure the suspect.96   
 
When explosives are suspected or encountered upon entry or during the 
course of clearing the building, the lead must shift rapidly between the EOD 
technician and the tactical team in order to render the device safe with the least 
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disruption to the tactical team’s momentum.  This rapid transfer of power can 
only be achieved through practice and drill. 
 
As tactical units train with external support personnel, initial trust is 
replaced by knowledge-based trust.  Knowledge-based trust develops over time 
as one accumulates trust-relevant knowledge through experience with the other 
person.97  The power to influence the situation required of an expert brought in to 
support a tactical operation when a relationship previously exists (as is 
developed through training) is based upon legitimacy, expertise, and reverence.  
This power and resulting trust is much more stable and grounded than power 
based solely on expertise, as is the case with initial trust.   
 
 Special operations teams that understand the hazard and risk 
assessment process through joint training and exercises function at a higher 
level of safety and efficiency.98  If USSOCOM’s three service components are to 
carry out their missions to full effectiveness, they must learn to depend on each 
other’s capabilities by working jointly.99  Ultimately, SOF components must be 
interoperable for they are more interdependent than elements of any other 
military force.100   
 
4. Overcoming Obstacles to Joint Training 
 
Despite the great need for and identified advantages of joint training, it 
occurs at best intermittently and usually under protest at some level.  The 
problem that most affects attainment of SOF jointness is ever-present service 
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bias.  As noted by former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, “The 
tendency for each service is to build into itself capabilities that will permit it to be 
independent of the other services.” 101  This tendency toward independence 
results in general objection to training that requires the integration of external 
support, such as EOD.  Consequently, when situations arise that do require 
experts from outside the tactical unit, prior relationships rarely exist and inter-
service bias tends to result in the request being made of the perceived expert 
within the requesting unit’s particular service rather than the expert who is best 
suited for the task.  “Routine contact eliminates conventional barriers to good 
communications, faith, trust, and cohesion.”102  At the tactical level, a paucity of 
real situations requiring EOD support relative to the number of tactical operators 
can lead to a false sense that it is unnecessary.  Frequent exercises that include 
threats requiring expertise outside the organic skills of the tactical unit and which 
require the request of support from EOD forces would both convince tactical units 
that the threat is real as well as lead to increased safety and efficiency, build high 
levels of trust among operators, and enhance mission effectiveness. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Many of the missions and core tasks of SOF place personnel in situations 
where they are likely to be threatened by explosive ordnance.  Counter 
proliferation of CBRNE is now the first priority of SOF103, and cannot be 
completed without EOD support.  Unfortunately, the documents that delineate CP 
as SOF’s primary mission do not recognize that any EOD support is required.104   
 
The threat encountered by the SOF may be the objective itself, as is the 
case with CP, or it may be denying access to the target, a tripwire or booby-trap.  
FID missions in certain parts of the world will involve extensive demining and 
UXO training.  CSAR operations often involve specialized insertion and 
extraction techniques and explosive hazards at the crash site.  Other missions 
may not entail foreseeable EOD requirements, but the possibility exists that the 
SOF team may encounter a requirement for EOD support once the mission has 
begun.  In these cases, an EOD unit with the training, mobility skills, and 
capabilities commensurate to the SOF unit would greatly enhance that unit’s 
effectiveness.  EOD technicians who can insert in any manner, no matter the 
training required or risk involved, who can operate seamlessly with the SOF unit 
at the objective, and can neutralize explosive threats and enable access to 
denied areas could prove invaluable.  In emergent crises requiring first-time 
access within a small window of opportunity, a force of this type may be the 
difference between mission completion and mission failure. 
 
Some skills and capabilities are common to all SOF, regardless of their 
specialty, and distinguish them from conventional forces.  These are high-risk 
tactics and techniques, such as HALO and HAHO freefall operations, clandestine 
insertion underwater via SCUBA, and CQB, that require training above and 
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beyond what is typical of conventional forces.  Other combat skills are not unique 
to SOF, but are developed to a degree greater than that of conventional forces.  
An EOD force directed to support SOF missions must possess these hyper-
conventional skills and capabilities if it is to act as a mission enabler, rather than 
a hindrance.  
 
Army and Marine Corps EOD forces are combat service support units 
more closely aligned with engineering and construction units than combat forces.  
Air Force EOD is organized and trained to provide critical services for airfield 
survivability and repair, but is further removed from combat than the combat 
service support units of the Army and Marine Corps.  Navy EOD, in stark 
contrast, is a combat support force.  Its detachments are equipped and organized 
to directly support combat operations, and Navy EOD technicians possess the 
individual skills and equipment to be significant additions to combat operations.  
In recognition of its unique skills and capabilities within the Department of 
Defense’s EOD forces, the Navy’s EOD force should be designated the sole 
provider of EOD support to SOF. 
 
A. A NOTE ON CIVILIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS 
 
Municipal SWAT teams’ long experience in tactical situations involving 
explosive threats allow several lessons to emerge from the civilian side of the 
operational spectrum.  These teams often encounter explosive hazards, from 
barricaded hostage-takers to booby-trapped methamphetamine labs.  Despite 
the increasing encounters with explosive hazards, some SWAT teams have not 
embraced the integration of EOD technicians into their tactical elements, 
preferring instead to call upon conventional police bomb squad personnel when 
needed.  This often adds to the response time of the SWAT team as they must 
wait for the bomb squad to arrive and become apprised of the situation.   
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Following the Columbine High School shooting in 1999, Deputy Inspector 
Joe Dempsey, bomb squad leader for the Arapahoe Sheriff’s Office, remarked 
that the incident demonstrated the importance of more closely integrating bomb 
experts with tactical units.  “Had bomb technicians deployed with the SWAT 
team, for example,” Dempsey said, “they could have told [the SWAT commander] 
that the bombs obstructing the emergency exit from the library posed no risk as 
long as they weren’t moved.”105  As it happened, the SWAT team delayed their 
entry into the library over two hours, a tactical decision for which the authorities 
received much criticism. 
Other SWAT teams have embraced the integration of bomb technicians 
into tactical operations with great success.  Kitsap County SWAT, in Washington 
State, is fortunate to have a member of the team who is also a certified bomb 
technician.  This has, in effect, allowed the full integration – to the point of 
indiscernability – of the bomb squad into tactical operations.  The technician’s 
position in the center of the assault element ensures explosive hazards are 
identified and handled quickly and with minimal effect on the operation.  
Commenting on this integration, SGT Jim Porter, the team’s operations sergeant, 
said: 
If we are aware of a specific explosive threat on an operation, we 
include him in the initial planning and follow his recommendations.  
If we encounter an explosive device during an operation our bomb 
tech would be responsible for [dealing with] the device.  Depending 
on the operation and advice from him, the team would either pull 
out until the device was rendered safe/ removed or complete the 
mission.106 
 
While having a bomb technician who is a full member of the tactical unit is 
a fortunate situation for the SWAT team and is representative of the ideal level of 
integration, the frequency of encounters probably does not require it.  A close 
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working relationship, facilitated by frequent joint training and a familiarity each 
other’s procedures, would suffice in those times when the tactical situation 
indeed calls for an explosive expert.  Military SOF both in and out of war zones, 
in contrast to the civilian operating environment, face an increased probability of 
encountering an explosive hazard.  This is due to the availability of explosives 
within regions in which SOF operate.  The threat is great enough to warrant the 
creation of a solution somewhere above the current model yet less than 
mandating the membership of EOD technicians on every SOF unit.  The creation 
of a SOF Mobile Unit (SOF MU) dedicated to training and equipping EOD 
technicians for support of special operations forces and missions would fill this 
need. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY  
 
Once a government makes the decision to take a hard-line stance against 
a barricaded enemy, a strategic game emerges from the direct action scenario. 
The players in this game are barricaded terrorists and the SOF that is assigned 
to assault the position.  Knowing an assault is forthcoming, the terrorists must 
decide if they want to impose an explosive threat (assuming the technical 
knowledge and supplies are available) to the assaulting force such as booby-
traps or IEDs placed at likely points of entry and along the assaulting force’s 
expected paths of movement.  Having made the decision to assault, the tactical 
unit commander must decide whether or not to integrate an EOD capability into 
his assault force.  If an explosive threat is encountered, an integrated EOD 
capability will likely allow the assault to continue and will save lives.  If there is no 
explosive threat, however, integration of outside personnel into the assaulting 
force will interrupt the extremely precise teamwork necessary to achieve relative 
superiority and maintain momentum through the target. 
 
The relative strength of the terrorists’ dominant strategy of posing an 
explosive threat is great, affording the terrorists a high security level regardless of 
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which strategy the SOF employs.  The SOF, on the other hand, has a dominant 
strategy of only mediocre strength.  It is interesting and worthwhile to note, 
however, that those characteristics that detract from the payoff value of the 
integration strategy for the SOF (such as the interruption of the precise teamwork 
that is necessary to achieve relative superiority in CQB and maintain momentum 
through the target) are trainable.  As such, those things, and the corresponding 
payoff value of integration, can be improved.  As SOF units and EOD support 
personnel train jointly the payoff value of the integration strategy approaches that 
of the non-integration strategy.  At its peak, when the two units are seamlessly 
integrated and indiscernible from one another, the payoff values are equal in the 
case that the terrorists do not pose an explosive threat.  In the case that they do 
pose such a threat, the payoff increases.  The utility of this strategic combination 
to SOFs (integrating EOD personnel when terrorists pose an explosive threat) is 
not the maximum attainable merely because there is more danger, despite the 
integrated capability to neutralize it, which makes this outcome of less utility than 
those when the terrorists do not pose any explosive threat at all.  It can be 
concluded that the payoff value that the SOF can guarantee itself is solely 
dependent upon the degree to which supporting EOD forces are integrated. 
 
C. JOINT TRAINING AND TRUST  
 
The missions outlined in Chapter II require the elite military and civilian 
tactical units tasked with them to integrate experts from outside their existing 
organizations.  In particular, tactical teams will need to call upon the expertise of 
an EOD technician, who can provide the ability to render safe explosive hazards 
such as IEDs and booby-traps as well as detect, identify, and provide first-line 
tactical protection from chemical, radiological, and nuclear hazards.  The 
extraordinarily high levels of trust required between teammates on tactical units 
can be achieved initially based upon the types of people that find their way onto 
specialized teams.  But the trust that is developed by frequent joint training 
involving both tactical teams and supporting elements is robust and stable.  Only 
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through exercises incorporating all threats likely to be encountered and requiring 
the tactical unit to request EOD support can seamless integration be achieved 
that will allow the elite unit to accomplish its mission, regardless of threats 




Navy EOD support of SOF should be further formalized and fully 
institutionalized.  Special operations planners must realize EOD support as 
critical to the completion of many high-priority missions and core tasks, and 
include EOD forces in any strategic plans and documents.  Further, these plan 
and documents should specify Navy EOD as the provider, leaving no question as 
to the source of support.  Necessary supporting documents and actions should 
be generated, such as a National Security Council Decision Directive (NSC DD) 
and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that focus on Navy EOD’s SOF 
support and open a funding line through the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OSD SO/LIC) for operations in 
support of GWOT. 
 
With current support operations as a base model, a few changes will result 
in the optimization of the EOD support that the Navy can provide to SOF.  The 
efforts of the current Navy EOD organization to meet the unique training 
requirements of a detachment assigned to support SOF has resulted in 
differences between units in Groups 1 and 2 and even between different Mobile 
Units within the same Group.  These differences in products, which are created 
to fill the same need, introduce an opportunity for inefficiency and a risk of failure.  
Consolidation of all requests for support of SOF into one Mobile Unit will 
standardize training packages and remove the risks associated with disparate 
products.  The training requirements and tactics, techniques and procedures 
associated with support of SOF missions differ enough from those of 
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conventional EOD detachments to warrant their organizational separation and 
the creation of a SOF MU dedicated to training and equipping EOD technicians 
for support of special operations. 
 
1. Characteristics and Benefits of a SOF Mobile Unit 
 
A SOF MU would allow for a standard training package to be created.  
While many hyper-conventional skills are core capabilities of Navy EOD, there 
are some schools and training courses that must be added to the individual level 
training plans for SOF support detachments.  Schools such as Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape (SERE), advanced tactical shooting training, and various 
individual level SOF-specific schools and courses are included in the training 
cycles of personnel assigned to NSW Dets and other SOF support detachments.  
Heightened operational tempo and constant changes to deployment schedules 
that are a result of operations during wartime cause differences in schooling 
received by detachments of different mobile units as well as those within the 
same mobile unit.  Consolidation of all training requirements specific to SOF 
support missions would streamline the training cycle and allow for a standard 
schedule and recurring billets at frequented schools and courses.  
 
More significant than improvements to training are the operational tactics, 
techniques and procedures that could be tailored to the mission within a SOF 
MU.  Currently, detachments train and deploy as full detachments, then operate 
in two man elements in support of SOF teams.  A SOF MU would allow this 
operational reality to be institutionalized.  Rather than a mobile unit comprising 
EOD detachments of seven to eight technicians, a SOF MU could have as its 
operational element-two man teams.  These teams, identified and created at the 
beginning of a training cycle deployable as separate elements to be attached to 
SOF units, would foster new levels of teamwork and camaraderie as each 
member must learn to count on and be responsible for the other.  The two-man 
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team concept would have the added benefit of being a closer fit to the 
operational model employed on the battlefield, and it would therefore better align 
the training cycle to prepare technicians for real-world operations.  Under the 
right leadership, a SOF MU could develop an organizational culture that greatly 
enhances its performance.  An organization that allows flexibility and encourages 
innovation while respecting professionalism and expertise would produce teams 
that fit seamlessly into existing SOF units. 
 
Two-man teams would also increase the number of SOF units that may be 
supported.  Each SOF support detachment could be broken down into four two-
man teams, each of which could support its own SOF unit.  The four-fold 
increase in support provided would allow the Navy’s EOD community to match 
the increasing pace of SOF buildup and operational tempo.  For example, if ten 
existing SOF support detachments were to be consolidated into a SOF MU 
employing the two-man team concept, up to eighty operational elements could be 
formed.  Even adopting a conservative rotation of one-third of the teams 
deployed, one-third in training, and one-third awaiting deployment orders or 
returning from deployment, over twenty-five teams could be maintained in the 
field.  These teams could be supporting SEAL task units, Army SF ODAs, or any 
other SOF unit anywhere in the world.  The result would be an EOD force that 
was as flexible as the special operations forces it was supporting.  Furthermore, 
teams returning from deployment could be easily rotated into a training role to 
immediately disseminate their lessons learned and experiences to teams 
preparing to deploy.  Thus a returning deployer’s experience would be 
maximized.  Maintaining the integrity of teams throughout an entire tour, to 
include multiple deployments and training cycles, would maintain an extremely 
high level of organizational readiness and institutional knowledge.  Within a few 
deployment cycles, a cadre of capable and trained teams could be maintained for 
emergent missions and short-notice support. 
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Critics have advanced several arguments against the creation of a mobile 
unit dedicated to SOF support.  They believe that the consolidation of SOF 
support missions and personnel specifically trained for them would have several 
negative effects upon the community as a whole.  They fear capabilities for 
conventional missions will be degraded as the SOF support missions attract 
attention, personnel, and money.  Critics also believe that the current cross-
pollination of NSW Det gear, training, and tactics, techniques and procedures to 
the rest of the force will be stemmed.  Finally, there exists the concern that the 
establishment of a “hyper-conventional” mobile unit would attract the best 
personnel and pull all talent from conventional forces. 
 
The creation of a SOF mobile unit would enhance the Navy EOD 
community’s capabilities for conventional missions rather than degrade them.  
Mobile units which must now divide their time and resources between 
conventional missions, such as Fleet support and mine countermeasures, and 
SOF support missions would be able to focus on the former.  Maintaining 
command and control of the SOF MU within the existing organizational structure, 
rather than attaching it to USSOCOM, would ensure that the Navy allocates 
resources such as money and personnel according to its priorities and that the 
SOF MU will not attract an inordinate amount of either. 
 
The exchange of innovations that are developed within NSW Dets with 
personnel in conventional detachments benefits the entire community.  While the 
consolidation of SOF support resources into one mobile unit may indeed stem 
that exchange, responsible detailing of personnel can improve it.  If assignment 
to the SOF MU is integrated into a sailor’s standard career path in the EOD 
community, rotation into and out of the unit can foster the diffusion of SOF-
specific ideas to the rest of the community.  In order to ensure the free exchange 
of personnel and ideas between the SOF and conventional mobile units, 
assignment to each must be viewed and weighed equally by promotion and 
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selection boards.  The higher risk inherent in “hyper-conventional” tactics as well 
as the stricter physical standards that would likely be required to be met for 
selection to the SOF mobile unit would restrict some sailors from assignment 
there.  Candidates for selection to the SOF mobile unit would have to be 
restricted to males in order to match the requirements of SOF, as well.  This 
would bar female EOD technicians from assignment to the mobile unit regardless 
of personal characteristics or physical qualifications.  The inability or lack of 
desire to be assigned to the SOF mobile unit must not be made a factor that 
would damage a sailor’s career.   
 
The effect of a SOF mobile unit as a “talent drain” on the conventional 
community can be mitigated by the active discouragement of sailors 
“homesteading” – serving several successive tours in the same place – within the 
command.  This would have the added benefit of enhancing cross-pollination of 
ideas between the SOF support and conventional communities, as well.  A 
requirement to rotate back to the conventional community after one or two tours 
at the SOF mobile unit would aid in the distribution of tactics, techniques and 
procedures throughout the community.  Close interaction between the staffs of all 
mobile units would help as well, and would also facilitate the flow of SOF tools 
and gear to the rest of the community. 
 
The intent of this thesis is not to argue for the permanent attachment of 
EOD technicians to tactical units. Rather, it is to suggest that the creation of a 
Navy EOD Mobile Unit dedicated to the support of SOF missions combined with 
frequent joint training can maximize the flexibility of EOD teams and optimize any 
support required for the completion of special operations.  It is significant, 
however, that the tactical benefits of employing a two-man team concept do not 
require the creation of a SOF MU.  An intermediate step between the present full-
detachment operational model and a SOF MU model is the employment of two-
man teams at existing Mobile Units.  The autonomy inherent in the detachments 
within a Mobile Unit allows a large degree of latitude in force employment among 
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them.  The NSW Dets could be dissolved upon return from current operational 
commitments and the personnel be reorganized in the two-man team concept.  
This restructuring could be done piecemeal, as deployment schedules allow, and 
would not affect the operations of other conventional detachments.  As 
deployment cycles progress, ultimately every NSW Det could be restructured in 
the two-man team model, allowing the tactical benefits of the model to be 
realized without the considerable effort and politicking required to create a SOF 
MU.  Adoption of the two-man team concept at existing Mobile Units would 
illustrate the benefits of the model, and provide support to proponents of a SOF 
MU. 
 
E. FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Opportunities for further research include case studies and an in depth 
foray into the organizational design and operational logistics of a SOF MU.  Case 
studies of the integration of EOD elements into elite tactical forces around the 
world such as the British SAS, Israeli YAMAM, and American SWAT teams and 
special mission units would require access to these secretive units that was 
unavailable to the author.  The training and integration of EOD support into the 
tactical elements of these units would provide a range of models upon which a 
SOF MU can base its design of its own operational elements.  Research into the 
operational procedures in use today by elite units would require a classification 
that is both unattractive to an author and incompatible with publication and 
general distribution of the finished product. 
 
A staggering amount of thought and effort must be put into the 
development of a new military unit.  From mission statements and organizational 
design to command hierarchies and tables of allowances listing required 
equipment in excruciating detail, the process requires paperwork both broad in 
range and deep in content.  These documents were beyond the scope of this 
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thesis.  The purpose of this thesis was to present the case for dedicated EOD 
support of SOF and present a possible solution of a Navy SOF EOD Mobile Unit.  
Whether or not such a unit is established is a decision that will be made in the 
upper levels of the Navy.  Such a radical alteration to a large bureaucratic system 
like the Navy takes considerable time and support from upper-level decision 
makers.  As the notion of a Mobile Unit that is dedicated to the training and 
equipping of EOD technicians for support of SOF missions takes hold, all of the 
supporting documents and organizational design of such a unit will become 
necessary. 
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APPENDIX A: BARRICADED TERRORISTS VS. ASSAULTING 
SOF: AN APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2004, Carlos Perez published his thesis, “Anatomy of a Hostage 
Rescue: What makes a hostage rescue successful?”  In it, he relied heavily upon 
Game Theory to conclude that the best strategy for a government facing 
hostage-takers was to adopt a hard-line stance and assault the target rather than 
negotiate.107   Building upon his conclusion, and expanding his parameters, this 
thesis analyzes the actions of the terrorists and SOF after the decision to assault 
has been made.  Specifically, should the terrorists pose an explosive threat, 
placing IEDs and booby-traps at points of entry and along the assaulting force’s 
expected paths of movement, and should the assaulting force commander 
integrate an EOD capability into his team at the expense of team cohesion and 
orchestrated precision? 
 
Once a government makes the decision to take a hard-line stance against 
a barricaded enemy, a new game emerges. Knowing an assault is forthcoming, 
the barricaded hostage-taker must now decide if he wants to impose an 
explosive threat (assuming the technical knowledge and supplies are available) 
to the assaulting force such as booby-traps or IEDs placed at likely points of 
entry and along likely paths of movement.  The tactical unit commander, once 
ordered to prepare for an assault, must decide whether or not to integrate an 
EOD capability into his assault force.  If an explosive threat is encountered, an 
integrated EOD capability will likely allow the assault to continue and will save 
lives.  If there is no explosive threat, however, integration of outside personnel 
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into the assaulting force will interrupt the precise teamwork necessary to achieve 
relative superiority in Close Quarters Battle (CQB) and maintain momentum 
through the target.   
 
B. THE PLAYERS 
 
As was true in Anatomy of a Hostage Rescue, the players in this game 
remain a barricaded enemy and the assaulting government force, but the terms 
have been expanded to add a breadth of relevancy across GWOT operations.  
The barricaded hostage-taker may be inferred to include any enemy of the 
established government who has established some sort of refuge.  This may 
indeed be a hostage-taker, but may also be a bomb-maker’s house or workshop, 
a storehouse for supplies along the IED flow-path, or a terrorist’s safe-house.  
The common characteristic is that it is a fixed site where the terrorists would have 
the time and means to pose an explosive threat.  The assaulting force can be 
any tactical unit, military or civilian, that is charged with direct action operations 
against armed opponents.  These units may be police SWAT teams or military 




In an attempt to determine a logical solution to the game described above, 
the principles of Game Theory are applied to the scenario.  First, the motivations 
of the terrorists are defined which will allow for the ordinal ranking of the various 
outcomes.  Then, the same is done for the SOF.  Once the motivations and 
ordinal rankings of various strategies are defined, the application of Game 
Theory principles identifies a dominant strategy for either player.  Analysis of 
emergent dominant strategies helps a tactical commander to make an informed 
decision regarding the integration of an EOD capability into the assaulting force.  
Analysis of one side necessarily means a corresponding analysis of the other, 
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and the dominant strategy that emerges for the terrorists can serve to inform 
government agencies in illuminating ways. 
 
D. MOTIVATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
 
1. The Terrorists 
 
The terrorists in this game are assumed to have as their motivation 
primarily the infliction of casualties.  Anatomy of a Hostage Rescue dealt with the 
negotiations process of the incident, and this game assumes that the government 
already has made the decision to assault.  This assumption is predicated on the 
government having weighed its policy options, employing diplomacy and 
negotiating as it sees fit.  Then, that the talks break down and the government 
decided to adopt a hard-line stance.  Therefore, the prospects of the terrorists 
obtaining their initial goals are slim and, realizing they are not to be successful, 
will attempt to capitalize upon their declining position.  Though their bargaining 
opportunities may be gone, they still have control over the hostages, the 
defensive advantage, and by this time will most likely have the attention of the 
media.  Because attracting attention is a main goal of any terrorist group108 and 
the reality of mass media is that “If it bleeds, it leads,” the terrorists are assumed 
at this point to adopt the primary motivation of causing as many casualties as 
possible.  Slowing down the assault and interrupting the SOF’s momentum is 
assumed to be a secondary motivation.  This will allow time for a spectacular end 
to the stand-off, whether that is a firefight, the execution of hostages, suicide, or 
some combination of the three.  A spectacular ending will command the media 
attention that is a primary goal of any terrorist attack.   It is further assumed that 
the terrorists have no inhibitions about using IEDs and booby-traps, nor about 
inflicting casualties on SOF or law enforcement personnel. 
 
                                            
108 Bruce Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 183; 
and Crenshaw, 383. 
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Given these motivations, the terrorists have the following alternative 
strategies once the government decides to mount an assault (Figure 2).  These 
strategies are ranked in order of preference, with 4 being most desirable and 1 
being the least.  The rankings are scaled in ordinal intervals only, and they do not 




Figure 2.   Terrorists’ Strategies 
 
 
2. The Special Operations Force 
 
The SOF is assumed to have as their motivation the capture or killing of 
hostile forces without sustaining casualties or allowing any hostages to be killed.  
This requires an assault that is as fast and unobstructed as possible.   
 
Given these motivations, the SOF has the following alternative strategies 
once the decision to assault is made (Figure 3).  Like the terrorists’ strategies, 
these strategies are ranked in order of preference, with 4 being most desirable 
4: Terrorists pose an explosive threat, SOF does not integrate EOD because 
they have the capacity to inflict casualties and will certainly slow down the 
assault. 
 
3: Terrorists pose an explosive threat, SOF integrates EOD because they still 
have the capacity to inflict casualties (though it is diminished) and will 
certainly slow down the assault. 
 
2: Terrorists do not pose an explosive threat, SOF integrates EOD capability 
because the tactical team is encumbered with outside personnel (which 
may slow them down and affect momentum. 
 
1: Terrorists do not pose an explosive threat, and SOF does not integrate 
EOD because SOF is free to bring their full range of skill and capabilities 
to bear in the assault. 
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and 1 being the least.  The rankings are scaled in ordinal intervals only, and they 
do not reflect relative utility to the SOF. 
 
 
Figure 3.   SOF Strategies 
 
 
E. APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY PRINCIPLES 
 
To begin modeling the game described above, each players’ strategies, 
now assigned ordinal values, are juxtaposed in a two-by-two matrix.  The 
resulting payoff values are shown for each strategic combination.  For example, 
the particular strategic combination where the terrorists pose an explosive threat 
(strategy C) and the SOF does not integrate an EOD capability (strategy B) 
results in the cell value BC: (1,4).  The payoff value set reflects the strategy 
combination BC’s value to the terrorists of 4 and of 1 to the SOF.  Payoff values 
of the other strategic combinations are shown in Table 4. 
 
4: SOF does not integrate EOD and does not encounter any explosive threats 
because this situation allows the fastest and most straightforward assault. 
 
3: SOF integrates EOD and does not encounter any explosive threats 
because, while outside personnel are integrated into the assaulting force, 
there are no obstacles to the momentum of the assault. 
 
2: SOF integrates an EOD capability and encounters an explosive threat 
because the momentum of the assault is interrupted, but they have the 
ability to deal with the obstacles, thus minimizing the obstacle's effect. 
 
1: SOF does not integrate an EOD capability and the assaulting force 
encounters an explosive threat because the assault's momentum is 











es Integrate EOD Capability [A] (2,3) (3,2)
Do Not Integrate EOD Capability 
[B] (1,4) (4,1)
Terrorists' Strategies
Pose Explosive Threat 
[C]
Do Not Pose Explosive Threat 
[D]
 
Table 4.   Initial Payoff Matrix 
 
The application of Game Theory principles to the game described above 
allows a player’s dominant strategy to emerge.  To determine a player’s 
dominant strategy, that player must analyze his strategic alternatives relative to 
his opponent’s alternatives.  For example, if the SOF was assumed to integrate 
an EOD capability into the assault team (strategy A), the terrorists would choose 
to pose an explosive threat (strategy C) because their payoff is greater (3 versus 
2) than if they did not.  Likewise, if the terrorists were to assume the SOF 
employed strategy B, they would themselves choose strategy C over D (enjoying 
a payoff of 4 versus 1).  Upon completion of this analysis, the terrorists would 
realize that the strategy returning the greatest payoff value is C regardless of 
which strategy the SOF chose.  Strategy C is referred to as the terrorists’ 
dominant strategy.  In their corresponding analysis, the SOF would realize that it 
does not have a dominant strategy.  Its greatest payoff value is dependent upon 
which strategy the terrorists choose.  If the terrorists were to choose strategy C, 
the SOF’s greatest payoff value would be returned by the employment of strategy 
A.  Similarly, if the terrorists employ strategy D, the SOF should choose strategy 








Pose Explosive Threat 
[C]









es Integrate EOD Capability [A] (2,3) (3,2)
Do Not Integrate EOD Capability 
[B] (1,4)
 
Table 5.   Analysis of Initial Game 
 
Since each player can be assumed to be rational and to seek to maximize 
their own benefit, the terrorists will choose to employ strategy C.  The SOF will 
see this through its own analysis, and will act accordingly by choosing strategy A.  
The strategic combination AC: (2,3) is said to be the game’s likely outcome.  This 
combination is also a Nash Equilibrium, an outcome from which neither player 
can unilaterally improve his payoff.  The payoff value set (2,3) can be considered 
to be the value of the game. 
 
Anatomy of a Hostage Rescue determined that the rescue force (or 
assaulting force) has a dominant strategy of conducting an assault.  The 
terrorists' best strategy, then, becomes killing the hostages (when, prior to 
analyzing the rescue force's strategies, no dominant strategy emerged).  It has 
been determined here that not only is the terrorists' best strategy to kill the 
hostages, but also to pose an explosive threat.  The SOF's best strategy then 
emerges: that of integrating an EOD capability into the assaulting force. 
 
Figure 4 is a graphical illustration of the application of Game Theory 
principles, as described above.  The strategic combination AC: (2,3) is apparent 




Figure 4.   Graphical Illustration of the Application of Game Theory Principles 
 
Using ordinal interval values the various strategic combinations above 
result in a zero-sum game.  The terrorist's best alternative is the SOF's worst, 
and vice versa.  Any improvement in the position of one player requires a 
corresponding decrease in the position of the other.  While this may be an 
accurate illustration of reality, it is simplified and not precise.  Ordinal rankings, 
as defined above, simply reflect the relative order of alternatives as ranked by 
each player rather than reflecting the relative utilities associated with each 
strategy.  In order to analyze the relative utility of each strategy to each player, 
cardinal interval scaling must be used.  To do so, the strategies assigned ordinal 
values of 1 and 4 are kept as upper- and lower-bounds on a scale expanded to 
10.  Alternative strategies that were ranked as 1 (worst strategy for that player) 
are still 1, but those ranked 4 (best outcome for that player) are now assigned the 
upper value of 10.  This allows the middle strategies, previously limited to either 2 
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or 3, to be assigned a value between 1 and 10 that more accurately reflects their 
utility to the player relative the other alternatives.  Figure 5 is the terrorists’ 
cardinal rankings of their alternative strategies. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Terrorists’ cardinal rankings of their alternative strategies 
 
Figure 6 is the SOF’s cardinal rankings of its alternative strategies. 
 
 
Figure 6.   SOF’s cardinal rankings of its alternative strategies 
 
10: Terrorists pose an explosive threat, SOF does not integrate EOD; because 
they have the capacity to inflict casualties and will certainly slow down the 
assault. 
 
6: Terrorists pose an explosive threat, SOF integrates EOD; because they still 
have the capacity to inflict casualties (though it is diminished) and will 
certainly slow down the assault. 
 
2: Terrorists do not pose an explosive threat, SOF integrates EOD capability; 
because the tactical team is encumbered with outside personnel (which 
may slow them down and affect momentum. 
 
1: Terrorists do not pose an explosive threat, and SOF does not integrate 
EOD; because SOF is free to bring their full range of skill and capabilities 
to bear in the assault. 
10: SOF does not integrate EOD and does not encounter any explosive threats; 
because this situation allows the fastest and most straightforward assault. 
 
8: SOF integrates EOD and does not encounter any explosive threats; 
because, while outside personnel are integrated into the assaulting force, 
there are no obstacles to the momentum of the assault. 
 
2: SOF integrates an EOD capability and encounters an explosive threat; 
because the momentum of the assault is interrupted, but they have the 
ability to deal with the obstacles, thus minimizing the obstacle's effect. 
 
1: SOF does not integrate an EOD capability and the assaulting force 
encounters an explosive threat; because the assault's momentum is 
interrupted and the force stands serious risk of suffering casualties. 
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Pose Explosive Threat 
[C]









es Integrate EOD Capability [A] (5,9) (8,2)
Do Not Integrate EOD Capability 
[B] (1,10) (10,1)
 
Table 6.   Matrix of payoff value sets that result from cardinal rankings of 
alternative strategies of each player 
 
If the game shown in Table 3 is analyzed further, interesting conclusions 
can be drawn from it.  When the payoff value sets are deconstructed to depict 
each player’s game only, the following analysis can be made.  Each player has 
already been assumed to be rational and to act in accordance with his own 
greatest benefit.  If each player is further assumed to adopt a conservative 
strategy of maximizing the payoff value of his worst-case (maximin) and 
minimizing the payoff value of his opponent’s best-case (minimax), each player’s 
respective payoff values are determined.  For example, in the terrorists’ game, 
the terrorists’ minimum values for each strategy they can themselves choose (C 
or D) are found (9 and 1, respectively).  Then, playing conservatively, the 
terrorists can choose the maximum of the two values, knowing that is the best of 
the worst-cases.  Correspondingly, the SOF, also playing conservatively and 
attempting to hold the terrorists’ payoff values to the minimum possible, find the 
maximum payoff values for the strategies over which it has control (A or C), (9 
and 10, respectively).  The SOF can then choose to play strategy A in the 
attempt to hold the terrorists’ maximum payoff values as small as possible.  In 
this way, the maximin and minimax values for the terrorists’ game are both 
determined to be 9.  This is referred to as the terrorists’ security level, that value 
that they can consider to be guaranteed by each player independently playing 
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their own conservative strategies.  Table 4 illustrates the determination of 
security levels in both the terrorists’ and SOF’s games. 
 
Terrorist's Game SOF's Game
C D minimax C D maximin
A 9 2 9 A 5 8 5
B 10 1 10 B 1 10 1
maximin 9 1 minimax 5 10
Terrorists' Security Level: 9 SOF's Security Level: 5  
Table 7.   Determination of security levels in both the terrorists’ and SOF’s 
games 
 
It becomes clear, through the determination of security levels, that the 
terrorists have a strong incentive to pose an explosive threat.  They achieve this 
if they play strategy C, referred to as their prudential strategy.  By doing so, they 
can guarantee themselves a payoff value of 9 regardless of what strategy the 
SOF employ.  The SOF’s security value, on the other hand, is only 5 if it plays its 
own prudential strategy of A.  Figure 7 illustrates the payoff polygon formed by 




Figure 7.   Payoff polygon formed by the combinations of cardinally ranked 
strategies and the security levels of each player 
 
It is interesting to note that those characteristics that detract from the 
payoff value of the integration strategy for the SOF (strategy A), such as the 
interruption of the precise teamwork necessary to achieve relative superiority in 
CQB and maintain momentum through the target, are trainable.  As such, those 
things, and the corresponding payoff value of integration, can be improved.  As 
SOF units and EOD support personnel train jointly the payoff value of the 
integration strategy approaches that of the non-integration strategy.  At its peak, 
when the two units are seamlessly integrated and indiscernable from one 
another, the payoff values are equal in the case that the terrorists do not pose an 
explosive threat.  In the case that they do pose such a threat, the payoff 
increases (from 5 to 8).  The utility of this strategic combination to the SOF 
(integrating EOD personnel, terrorists pose an explosive threat) is not 10 merely 
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because there is more danger, despite the integrated capability to neutralize it, 
which makes this outcome of less utility than those when the terrorists do not 
pose any explosive threat at all.  Table 8 illustrates the game when joint training 





Pose Explosive Threat 
[C]









es Integrate EOD Capability [A] (8,9) (10,2)
Do Not Integrate EOD Capability 
[B] (1,10) (10,1)
 
Table 8.   Illustration of the game when joint training between SOFs and EOD 
units allows them to achieve indiscernability 
 
Table 9 shows the determination of each player’s security values when 
joint training between SOF and EOD units results in indiscernability.  Note that, 
as the result of joint training, the SOF’s security value is now 8.  This illustrates 
the relationship between joint training and the SOF’s security level.  It can be 
concluded that the payoff value that the SOF can guarantee itself is solely 
dependent upon the degree to which supporting EOD forces are integrated. 
 
Terrorist's Game SOF's Game
C D minimax C D maximin
A 9 2 9 A 8 10 8
B 10 1 10 B 1 10 1
maximin 9 1 minimax 8 10
Terrorists' Security Level: 9 SOF's Security Level: 8
 
Table 9.   Determination of each player’s security values when joint training 
between SOF and EOD units results in indiscernability 
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Figure 8 depicts the payoff polygon formed by the combinations of 
cardinally ranked strategies when joint training has resulted in indiscernability 
between the SOF and EOD forces and the security levels of each player. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Payoff polygon formed by the combinations of cardinally ranked 
strategies and the security levels of each player when joint training has 




Once a government makes the decision to take a hard-line stance against 
a barricaded enemy, a strategic game emerges. The players in this game are 
barricaded terrorists and the SOF that is assigned to assault the position.  
Knowing an assault is forthcoming, the terrorists must now decide if they want to 
impose an explosive threat (assuming the technical knowledge and supplies are 
available) to the assaulting force such as booby-traps or IEDs placed at likely 
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points of entry and along the assaulting force’s expected paths of movement.  
Having made the decision to assault, the tactical unit commander must decide 
whether or not to integrate an EOD capability into his assault force.  If an 
explosive threat is encountered, an integrated EOD capability will likely allow the 
assault to continue and will save lives.  If there is no explosive threat, however, 
integration of outside personnel into the assaulting force will interrupt the 
extremely precise teamwork necessary to achieve relative superiority and 
maintain momentum through the target. 
 
When the various combinations of each player’s alternative strategies are 
ranked in order of precedence (ordinal interval scaling) and the principles of 
Game Theory are applied to them, a zero-sum game emerges.  This is not 
surprising, as the two players are in direct opposition to one another and one 
player’s best outcome is the other player’s worst.  Illustrated graphically, the 
outcomes form a downward-sloping line, where every combination is Pareto 
optimal and neither player can improve his standing without a corresponding 
decrease in the position of the other. 
 
The terrorists have a dominant strategy of posing an explosive threat, and 
the SOF can be assumed to respond to this strategy and maximize their own 
payoff by integrating an EOD capability into the assaulting force.  This is the 
likely outcome of this game.  But when the strategic combinations are assigned 
relative utilities and ranked accordingly (cardinal interval scaling), analysis of the 
resulting game is more telling. 
 
The relative strength of the terrorists’ dominant strategy of posing an 
explosive threat great, affording the terrorists a security level of 9 regardless of 
which strategy the SOF employs.  The SOF, on the other hand, has a security 
level of only 5 in this game.  It is interesting and worthwhile to note, however, that 
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those characteristics that detract from the payoff value of the integration strategy 
for the SOF, such as the interruption of the precise teamwork that is necessary to 
achieve relative superiority in CQB and maintain momentum through the target, 
are trainable.  As such, those things, and the corresponding payoff value of 
integration, can be improved.  As SOF units and EOD support personnel train 
jointly the payoff value of the integration strategy approaches that of the non-
integration strategy.  At its peak, when the two units are seamlessly integrated 
and indiscernable from one another, the payoff values are equal in the case that 
the terrorists do not pose an explosive threat.  In the case that they do pose such 
a threat, the payoff increases (from 5 to 8).  The utility of this strategic 
combination to SOFs (integrating EOD personnel, terrorists pose an explosive 
threat) is not 10 merely because there is more danger, despite the integrated 
capability to neutralize it, which makes this outcome of less utility than those 
when the terrorists do not pose any explosive threat at all.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the payoff value that the SOF can guarantee itself is solely 
dependent upon the degree to which supporting EOD forces are integrated. 
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